Nuclear waste disposal in space by Nelson, R. W. et al.
r: ' . .r 
NASA 
' T P  
1225 
c.1 ,' 
Nuclear Waste Disposal in Space 
I 
R. E. Burns, W. E. Causey, 
W. E. Galloway, and-R. W. Nelson ' 
1 
b 
MAY 1978 
\ 
, iunsn - , , .. , .  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19780015628 2020-03-22T05:03:50+00:00Z
Q 
TECH LIBRARY KAFB, NM 
I lll11111 lllll IIIII llll11111 lll Il1 11 
01344b7 
NASA Technical Paper 1225 
Nuclear Waste Disposal in Space 
R. E. Burns, W. E. Causey, 
W. E. Galloway, and R. W. Nelson 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 
National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration 
Scientific and Technical 
Information Office 
1978 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The authors wish to thank Wayne Deaton, Charles Guttman, J. Gregory DeField, 
William Bailey, Jack Loose, and Larry Lott for their contribution to this report. 
Also, the personnel of Battelle, Inc., Northrop Services, Inc., and Science 
Applications, Inc., deserve recognition for their major contributions to the effort. 
Although not involved contracturally, personnel at Oak Ridge National Laboratory have 
provided critically needed information. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 SUMMARY 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 I. INTRODUCTION 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 A. Reason for the Study 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 B. Study Ground Rules 
3 C. Generation of Waste in Nuclear Reactors . . . . . . . . . . .  
6 D. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 E. Previous Studies 
7 F. 
Character of High-Level Waste and the Need for Isolation 
Comparison of Space and Terrestrial Options . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . .  
11. POST-REACTOR PROCESSING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
A. Waste Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
B. General Discussion of Separation of Nuclear Waste Products . . .  8 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 C. Waste Mixes for Evaluation 
21 D. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 E. Waste Forms 
Definition of Required Level of Partitioning . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 111. SPACE OPTIONS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 A. High Earth Orbit .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32 B. Lunar Orbit 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33 C. Lunar Soft Landing 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 D. Solar Orbit 
E. Solar System Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42 
F. Solar Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42 
G. Space Option Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42 
IV. NUCLEAR WASTE PACKAGING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45 
A. Waste Canister. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45 
B. Radiation Shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50 
C. Mechanical Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54 
D. Thermal Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61 
E. Ejection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62 
V. MISSION SCENARIO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64 
... 
111 
.. . - - ...... . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 
Page 
VI . GROUND OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A . Transportation from Reprocessor to Receiving Facility at 
Launch Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . Launch Site Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
C . Required Equipment and Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
D . Comparison of Ground Operations for Space Disposal Versus 
Terrestrial Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VI1 . SAFETY AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .  
A . Ground Handling Safety Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . Flight Operations Safety Guideline . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
C . Special Procedures/Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VI11 . SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS . . . .  
A . Space Shuttle and Required Modifications . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . OTV Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
C . Reusable Versus Expendable OTV . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
D . Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
E . Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
67 
67 
68 
74 
75 
80 
83 
85 
87 
89 
90 
90 
92 
95 
96 
105 
iv 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Title Page 
Study options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
US.  nuclear power generating capacity GW(e). . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Waste generated by U.S. nuclear power industry . . . . . . . . .  10 
Thermal conductivity versus temperature for UOz cermets 
and their matrix metals 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Space options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31 
Flight profile for the lunar orbit mission . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 
Perturbations produced by lunar and solar gravity on a highly 
eccentric immediate orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37 
Long term variations in aphelion and perihelion . . . . . . . . .  39 
AV and period versus OTV burntime for 0.86 AU mission . . . . .  
Risk profile for solar orbit disposal with retrieval . . . . . . . . .  
40 
41 
AV and period versus OTV burntime for solar system escape 
mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43 
Hexagonal packaging configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46 
Telescoping package configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47 
Radial and orthogonal finning concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48 
15. Nuclear waste maximum temperature versus angle between fins 
at various fin thicknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49 
16. Typical shield for the cylindrical or hexagonal package . . . . . .  53 
17. Typical shield for the hemispherical shield . . . . . . . . . . .  53 
18. Shield weight for 19 cylinder configuration . . . . . . . . . . .  55  
19. Neutron shielding effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56 
V 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) 
Figure 
20. 
21 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
3 2. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
Title Page 
57 Shield weight as a function of waste density . . . . . . . . . . .  
Shield weight for the different mixes (waste density = 4 gm/cm3) . . 58 
Orbiter/payload separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63  
Orbiter/payload separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63  
Orbiter/ET impact trace for ETR launch (yaw steering after 
69 
7 0  
SRB separation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Orbiter/ET impact trace for Trindade launch . . . . . . . . . .  
Remote operational base concept Trindade Island (Brazil) . . . . .  72 
73 Deorbit opportunities for Trindade launch . . . . . . . . . . .  
73 Deorbit opportunities for KSC launch . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Nuclear payload flow 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78 Cocoon flow 
81 High Earth orbit mission event sequence window . . . . . . . . .  
Detailed task steps of mission event sequence . . . . . . . . . .  82 
Total mission savings versus OTV ISP . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91 
Launch rates for LSL mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100 
Launch rates for the Class I STS-derived HLLV (Mix 3) . . . . . .  101 
Launch rates for LSL mission (Mix 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102 
103 Launch rates for Mix 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Title Page 
Properties of the Fission Products and Actinide Elements that 
Occur in the Waste Mixture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 
Thermal Density of Each Waste Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
25 Oxides and Some of Their Properties. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Description of Specimens Used for Physical-Property 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 Measurements 
34 Nuclear Waste Rendezvous Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
52 
54 
Photon Source Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Gamma Shield Material Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
71 ETR and Trindade Launch Site Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  
Potential Accidents Involving Terrestrial Handling of Nuclear 
Waste for Space Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Boost Vehicle Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
84 
89 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89 Upper Stage Concepts 
97 Shuttle Weight Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
97 Class I STS-Derived HLLV Weight Statement. . . . . . . . . . .  
98 Class I1 STS-Derived HLLV Weight Statement . . . . . . . . . .  
98 Ballistic HLLV Weight Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
99 Class I1 Winged HLLV Weight Statement . . . . . . . . . . . .  
99 Total Number of Flights for Various Combinations . . . . . . . .  
vii 
GLOSSARY 
AEC 
AGNS 
Calcine 
CSP 
Curie 
DDT&E 
DOT 
E1 S 
EML 
EPA 
ERDA 
ET 
FACA 
GSE 
GWe 
HE0 
HLLV 
HLW 
IUS 
KSC 
LEO 
Le RC 
LMFBR 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Allied General Nuclear Services 
Oxidized HLW 
Cocoon-shield Package 
3.7 X 10' Disintegrations Per Second 
Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
Department of Transportation 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Earth-Moon-Line 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Energy Research and Development Administration 
External Tank 
Failure and Contingency Analysis 
Ground Support Equipment 
Gigawatts Electrical 
High Earth Orbit 
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle 
High Level Waste 
Inertial Upper Stage 
Kennedy Space Center 
Low Earth Orbit 
Lewis Research Center 
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor 
viii 
LSL 
LWR 
M 
MWD 
MT 
NEPA 
NRC 
ORNL 
OTV 
PCR 
PWR 
RCS 
RMS 
SRB 
SRM 
STS 
Lunar Soft Landing 
Light Water Reactor 
Molar 
Megawatt Days 
Metric Ton 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Oak Ridge National Laboratories 
Orbit Transfer Vehicle 
Payload Changeout Room 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Reaction Control System 
Remote Manipulator System 
Solid Rocket Booster 
Solid Rocket Motor 
Space Transportation System 
ix 
I 
TECHNICAL PAPER 
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL IN SPACE 
SUMMARY 
The disposal of certain components of high level nuclear waste in space appears to 
be feasible from a technical standpoint. Disposal of all high level waste (Mix No. 1) in 
space is impractical because of the high launch rate required, and the resulting 
environmental impact, energy requirements, and economic factors. Thus, some form of 
waste separation will be required. A separation of just the unused uranium and cladding 
reduces the launch rate by a factor of approximately 40. 
Of the five space destinations considered, the lunar surface and solar orbit options 
are the most attractive from an overall mission safety standpoint. Certain low probability 
subsystem failures could leave the waste package in an unplanned orbit from which it 
must be recovered. Thus, a prerequisite for flying either of the aforementioned missions 
is a demonstrated space rescue capability. 
The Space Shuttle plus a high performance orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) are 
sufficient vehicles for space transportation of nuclear waste. Some Shuttle modifications 
will be required, but these should be considered as minor. A Shuttle derived heavy lift 
launch vehicle (HLLV) could be effectively utilized in the 1990 time frame if it becomes 
available. 
Thermal control is one of the most difficult technical problems associated with 
the space disposal of nuclear waste. Due to  the high thermal density and low thermal 
conductivity of the waste, the waste will either have to be packaged in a container with 
fins for conducting the heat to  the outer surface, or encased in a metal matrix that results 
in a higher overall thermal conductivity. In either case, additional weight will have to  be 
carried to solve the thermal problem. 
Suitable state-of-the-art materials exist €or the container and shielding although 
further work would be most helpful. A reentry protection system is required in case of 
catastrophic abort prior to achieving Earth orbit. This protection system will allow safe 
reentry and should be designed to  withstand impact loads. As a result of the weight 
penalties for thermal control, shielding, ejection requirements, and reentry protection, the 
nuclear waste represents only approximately 15 percent of the total Shuttle payload 
weight. 
The storage of nuclear waste in space does not appear to be an attractive option. 
Storage would generally be limited, time-wise, by the life time of the container. An 
exception to this is the lunar surface mission since remote mining techniques could be 
employed to recover the waste from the lunar surface. Also, the cost of retrieving waste 
stored in space would be high in comparison with the original cost of transporting, the 
waste to space. This is due to  the increased mission operation complexity, and the fact 
that it requires more propellant to retrieve a payload than it does to deliver it. 
Space disposal of nuclear waste is an option which offers permanent disposal of 
the waste, and has the unique characteristic that the mission risk period in which critical 
failure can occur is limited to a few days in the case of the lunar surface mission, and to 
approximately 6 months for the solar orbit mission. Failures can be detected in real time 
and corrective action can be initiated immediately. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A. Reason for the Study 
Recently, the subject of disposal of nuclear waste has received a lot of attention. 
Articles on this topic have appeared in many of the leading magazines and newspapers. In 
this country the Connecticut Yankee decision has restricted the growth of the nuclear 
power industry until a satisfactory solution to the nuclear waste problem is found. Thus, 
it appears that the nuclear waste problem threatens the nuclear power industry. 
The U.S. Government Department of Energy (DOE) is currently studying the 
disposal of high-level waste in deep geological formations having good ion exchange 
potential, low permeability, no ground water, a stable history, and freedom from seismic 
activity. Sea bed disposal is also being considered. One of the biggest drawbacks to the 
two aforementioned techniques appears to be the lack of public acceptance, and as the 
public’s awareness of nuclear waste problem increases this could become more of a 
problem. 
The possibility of disposal of nuclear waste in space has been considered 
previously [ 1,2], and it was determined to be feasible from a technical standpoint. These 
studies only considered one destination, solar system escape, and one group of elements, 
the actinides, for space disposal. The purpose of this study is to expand the space options 
to include additional destination, various waste mixes, and identify Space Transportation 
Systems (STS) requirements for the space disposal of nuclear waste. The main intent is to 
identify problem areas and to compare the various options so that the most promising 
options can be analyzed in more detail. 
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B. Study Ground Rules 
To bound the scope of the study, the following ground rules were adopted: 
(1) Disposal and storage options should be considered. 
(2) Only domestic commercial reactor waste is considered. 
(3) Waste is at least 10 years old. 
(4) Various waste mixtures should be analyzed, ranging from total waste to very 
specialized waste products. 
(5) Conventional space vehicles should be emphasized. 
(6) Safety should be the main criterion for selecting preferred options and 
defining the overall mission profile. 
In addition to  these ground rules, which were adopted early in the study, there were 
options such as space destinations, type of space vehicles to  utilize, etc., that were 
considered; however, the options had to be narrowed down to focus the analysis on the 
most promising and desirable concepts. Figure 1 presents the various study options. 
C. Generation of Waste in Nuclear Reactors 
The commercial nuclear power industry in the U.S. currently has an operating 
capacity of approximately 50 GWe and plans to expand significantly in the future. These 
nuclear power plants discharge their spent fuel on approximately the basis of one-third of 
the reactor core annually, resulting in an accumulation of highly radioactive material 
which is very toxic, generates a considerable thermal inventory, and has nuclear half-lives 
of as much as hundreds of thousands of years. Unusable constituents of this fuel present 
a potential hazard to current and future generations if not disposed of properly. One 
possibility for disposal is to solidify the liquid wastes from reprocessing into a form 
which is inert to  chemical attack or dissolution, encase it in massive containers, and 
dispose of it in govemment-controlled repositories on Earth for the eons of time required 
for its isolation. 
Because of the length of time involved and the many potential changes in the 
Earth's crust during this time that could affect terrestrial or sea disposal, a decision was 
made to  evaluate the concept of disposal of the waste in extra-terrestrial locations. This 
would conceivably result in less potential for undesired exposure of the population to  
this material by its permanent removal from the biosphere. The evaluation is considered 
co be conceptually valid for any nuclear fuel cycle which will generate waste materials. 
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Figure 1 .  Study options. 
The reference nuclear reactor mix upon which this evaluation has been based 
consists completely of light water reactors (LWR) to  the year 2000, which is the period 
of study selected to  coincide with expected availability of the Space Shuttle as a 
transport vehicle. The scenario which is assumed for growth. of nuclear capacity is that 
released by ERDA in late 1976 [ 3 ] ,  designated as their Low Case, and reproduced as 
follows : 
1975 30 
1980 60 
1985 127 
1990 195 
2000 3 80 
The liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) was eliminated from consideration 
because of the unlikely commercialization in time to  have solidified wastes available for 
disposal prior to  2000, i.e., with the 10-year elapsed time between reactor withdrawal 
and waste disposal. 
The LWR’s were considered to  be operable in the “throwaway” mode without 
uranium or plutonium recycle and to  be operated to a uniform fuel burnup of 33 000 
MWD. This latter assumption is recognized as being slightly above general practice but, 
thereby, results in conservative design of system components. However, it is assumed that 
reprocessing facilities are available where it might be desirable to go through the head end 
(chop and dissolve fuel from elements) of reprocessing to generate a waste ,stream 
consisting of the entire fuel assembly, less hulls. Such an activity was conceived as a 
method of substantially reducing the waste volume as compared with disposal of 
complete fuel assemblies. The LWR waste situation was also examined from the 
standpoint that either uranium or plutonium, or both, might be separated from the waste 
stream and ultimately recycled. Finally it was considered that there should be the 
capability to  separate (i.e., selectively remove) some nuclides from the liquid waste and 
thus achieve the flexibility of choosing specific isotopes for space disposal while leaving 
less hazardous materials on Earth where they might be safely stored in engineered 
facilities. 
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D. Character of High-Level Waste and the Need for Isolation 
The high-level nuclear wastes derived from reprocessing of spent reactor fuel 
assemblies are produced when the assemblies are mechanically chopped and the fuel 
pellets are then dissolved in 2 to 3 M nitric acid. Uranium and plutonium are then 
coextracted from the aqueous solution into an organic phase of tributyl phosphate 
dissolved in kerosene. The two actinides are subsequently separated by selective oxidation 
and solvent extraction and in the fuel recycle mode of reactor operation are then sent 
back into the fuel fabrication plants. 
The aqueous raffinate from this process is generally considered the high-level 
waste. The major constituents are the fission products; the actinides which include all of 
the neptunium, americium, and curium and small amounts of uranium and plutonium; 
and nitric acid. In addition, there are lesser amounts of corrosion products and deliberate 
inert additives (e.g., Gd, Fe, Cr, Ni, Na, etc.) used for control of chemical reactivity. The 
precise composition of this waste depends on a number of variables [4].  The nuclides 
present are a function of the reactor type, the original fuel composition, bumup 
achieved, the time elapsed from reactor discharge, and other factors such as slight changes 
in reprocessing chemistry. 
While not normally considered as high-level wastes, there are gaseous isotopes of 
xenon, iodine, krypton, carbon, etc., which are released during reprocessing. It may be 
desirable or required to capture and immobilize these materials to minimize human 
exposure. 
E. Previous Studies 
The feasibility of transporting radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power 
plants into space was first investigated in 1973 by NASA, Lewis Research Center (LeRC) 
[ l ]  at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The results of this 
exploratory study indicated that disposal into space of the long-lived actinides appeared 
feasible, from both an economic and safety viewpoint. Likethe current study, the LeRC 
study utilized the Space Shuttle and a cryogenic upper stage as.the space transportation 
vehicles. A major difference between the current study and the LeRC study was the 
method of shielding the nuclear payload. The heavy radiation shields were carried to the 
final destination in the LeRC study, whereas in the current study the shields are 
removed and returned to Earth for reuse once the payload is in low Earth orbit. 
Removing the shields in low Earth orbit increases the actual amount of nuclear waste 
that can be carried on a single flight by a factor of 5 to 6. The only space destination 
considered in the LeRC study was solar system escape. 
6 
Reference 2 describes a space disposal concept that utilizes the decay heat of 
actinide wastes to  power an electrically propelled space vehicle. The vehicle is launched 
by the Space Shuttle to Earth orbit and to  Earth escape by a cryogenic upper stage. The 
electrically powered vehicle is a high performance vehicle and can carry approximately 4 
to  5 times the payload of a chemically powered upper stage. One main drawback to this 
concept is that the flight time to reach solar system escape is 848 days, and this imposes 
a severe lifetime requirement on all subsystems. Also, this approach requires a high 
thermal density payload and would limit the nuclear waste payload to  the actinides. 
The current study is broader than the two studies previously described in that 
various space destinations and various mixes of the nuclear waste are considered. 
F. Comparison of Space and Terrestrial Options 
Even at the present level of understanding, it is apparent the space and terrestrial 
options for nuclear waste management have differing characteristics. 
The Earth isolation methods have the advantage of requiring relatively standard 
transportation schemes to  reach the containment site, i.e., there are relatively few 
problems with delivery. Once the containment site has been reached and emplacement 
operations completed, long term problems could arise. The extremely long periods of 
confinement that are required cannot necessarily be assumed because the geologic 
structure is quite ancient already. Physical conditions change when thermally hot wastes 
are implanted in such an area. Furthermore, catastrophic events such as earthquakes or 
intrusive acts by deranged humans are always a possibility. Lower level failures (such as 
a breach by ground water) could occur over geologic time periods without visible 
evidence for many years. 
The space option has a very different set of problems. The entire risk in space 
disposal occurs during transport to  the destination. Once the destination has been 
attained, the laws of physics then preclude an accidental return of the waste to man’s 
environment. (Catastrophic events of the level of planetary collisions are excluded, but, in 
such a case, nuclear waste could hardly be considered to  pose any additional hazard.) 
Intrusive acts by man under the space option can be logically ignored because the 
technology required to  attain space travel is more complex than that required to  generate 
nuclear waste. 
Another important distinction that occurs between the Earth and space options is 
that a failure in space would be detected in real time and corrective action would be 
immediately initiated. The risk associated with space disposal is of importance if an 
accident can occur which would result in a noncorrectable situation. 
This report will discuss the design of a space disposal mission which attempts to 
preclude noncorrectable events. 
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I I. POST- R E ACTOR P ROC ESSl NG 
A. Waste Projections 
The practicality of disposal of nuclear waste in space depends very strongly upon 
how much nuclear waste will be generated. Although space offers complete isolation of 
waste from the biosphere, it is a rather exotic method of disposal and could not be 
considered for many toxic substances (such as industrial wastes). Nuclear power is a 
unique industrial process in that it produces very small amounts of very toxic waste. This 
combination makes space disposal a viable option. 
Projections of nuclear generating capacity are given in Reference 5. From these 
projections, the amount of accumulated waste can be estimated if the type of reactor to 
be utilized in the production of power is also assumed [5] .  It should be noted that these 
projections are not absolute, however. 
The utilization or nonutilization of a breeder reactor could similarly modify the 
projections of accumulated waste. As with any natural resource, estimates vary on just 
how much uranium is available. Without a breeder the supply of uranium could be a 
limiting factor on just how much nuclear power could exist. 
Other considerations that will affect the total mass of waste accumulated in the 
world come from foreign countries. These countries make choices that do not depend 
upon the decisions of the U.S. and can be expected to operate independently of the U.S. 
Nonetheless, our environment will depend upon their decisions since nature does not 
recognize man-made laws. 
The present study deals only with civilian U.S. waste. The projections of 
Reference 5 are summarized in Figures 2 and 3. 
B. General Discussion of Separation of Nuclear Waste Products 
Nuclear waste products arise when a fissionable atom (generally Th, U, or Pu) 
absorbs a free neutron and breaks into two or more portions. In’some cases, the 
absorption of an additional neutron does not result is fission but rather in a simple 
increase in atomic number. Subsequent radioactive decay can then create new elements of 
higher atomic number than the original atom. Those elements which result from 
absorption rather than fission are members of the actinide family and will be so called. 
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Figure 2. U.S. nuclear power generating capacity GW(e). 
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Figure 3.  Waste generated by U.S. nuclear power industry. 
The disposal/management of nuclear waste is simplified if these nuclear waste 
products can be separated into groups. If the discussion of separation is restricted to a 
uranium cycle reactor,’ several distinct components of the spent reactor rods can be 
immediately identified: 
(1) “Unburned” uranium - This is uranium which was unaffected by neutron 
absorption. Since the original fuel was a mixture of the isotopes U235 and U238, the 
unburned uranium will also be a mixture of the same isotopes. This is, by far, the largest 
single component of the spent rods. 
(2) Cladding (which has been used to encapsulate the uranium fuel) - This is 
usually an alloy called zircalloy, consisting primarily of zirconium as well as small 
amounts of tin, chromium, and nickel [ 7 ] .  This is the second largest component, by 
weight, of the spent rods. I t  usually constitutes approximately one-fourth to  one-third 
the weight of a reactor rod bundle. 
(3) Fission products - These were mentioned previously and will be further 
discussed. 
(4) Actinide elements - These were mentioned previously and will be further 
discussed. 
(5) Additional impurities - Although not a Component of the original waste, 
certain other elements will necessarily be introduced into the wastes as processing occurs. 
These impurities come from such varied sources as corrosion of pipes (Fe, Cr, Ni, etc.), 
absorption of neutrons by nitrogen to produce carbon (C’ ), other additives directly 
related to  processing, etc. 
To quantify the problems of separation, we begin with a discussion of exactly 
what elements can be expected to be present in the spent rod. While there is a nonzero 
probability that any element could be created by uranium fission, many of the elements 
are present in negligible quantity; therefore, we concentrate on the section of the 
periodic table between germanium (Z = 32) up to, and including, erbium (Z = 68). In 
addition, the actinides begin, effectively, at uranium (Z = 92) through curium (Z = 96). 
Elements below uranium occur (due to  decay) as well as elements above curium, but 
their concentrations are totally negligible. Besides a simple inventory of the wastes, 
certain properties of the existing isotopes are important for considerations of space 
disposal. These properties include the gamma radiation output (which affects shield 
design), thermal output (which affects system design), mass percentage of the particular 
element (which affects space flight launch rates), toxicity (which gives a measure of the 
urgency that it be eliminated), etc. Thus, many parameters must be known to design a 
system for space disposal. 
1. Numerous types of reactors are used for various applications; for this report a PWR 
which has a neutron flux of 3.89 X 10l3  n/cm2 s and a fuel burnup at 33 000 MWD 
is assumed. The program used in calculation of the individual waste components is 
found in Reference 6. 
Additional considerations which are harder to quantify also play important roles 
in space disposal. For example, the chemical separability of a given element may be more 
important or less important depending upon some or all of these considerations. 
Additional chemical/physical properties are dependent upon the specific form of the 
wastes, i.e., density, thermal conductivity, corrosive behavior with respect to container 
material, etc. The sum total of these comments is that a comprehensive design of the 
content, form, and systems integration for nuclear waste disposal is very complex. The 
comments here should outline the problems that exist and indicate directions that show 
promise. At this time, however, a full description cannot be given. 
Table 1 shows some important properties of the fission products and actinide 
elements that occur in the waste mixture. 
C. Waste Mixes for Evaluation 
The purpose of space disposal of nuclear waste is to minimize radioactive hazards 
to man and the environment. This simple statement has rather complex implications. 
To best realize the trades that must be made to minimize hazards, consider the 
implications of sending various fractions of the waste to  space. If the fuel rod bundles 
were removed from a reactor and sent, in toto, to  space there is n'o difficulty with 
spreading the material during chemical processing since there is no processing. In this 
case, however, a very large number of space flights will be required and the possibility of 
an ascent failure is obviously increased (even when excluding the economics and energy 
penalties involved). If some subfractions of the wastes are eliminated, then the economic 
and energy penalty considerations become more favorable and fewer flights improve 
ascent safety; however, we are now faced with the requirement of operating a separation 
plant in a secure and efficient manner, which is no small task. 
The energy penalty for carrying all nuclear wastes exactly as it comes from the 
reactor (previously mentioned) involves two considerations. The most obvious of these is 
the fuel required to launch the waste into space, including such components as petroleum 
to haul the waste, gasoline expended by employees, and (of dominent importance) the 
fuel for the spacecraft. A second major component of the energy penalty is the fact that 
unused fissile materials are being wasted. The original mined uranium, before enrichment, 
contains only 0.71 percent of the fissionable isotopes 92U235 and the concentration of 
this isotope is increased to approximately 3.3 percent (via enrichment) for reactor 
operation. The removed reactor rods contain approximately 0.843 percent of the 
isotope, which is a valuable fuel source. Additionally, the plutonium formed in the 
reactor is also a valuable fuel source; however, separation of the plutonium presents a 
potential security risk in that it can be used to construct fission weapons. This risk is 
sufficiently serious that the present administration has baselined geologic storage of 
unprocessed reactor rods. If this policy remains in effect there is only a small chance that 
space disposal is a viable option due to the reasons of economics and energy penalty. 
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TABLE 1. PROPERTIES OF THE FISSION PRODUCTS AND ACTINIDE 
ELEMENTS THAT OCCUR IN THE WASTE MIXTURE 
Element 
Ge 
As 
Se 
Rb 
Sr 
Y 
Zr 
Nb 
M o  
Tc 
RLI 
Rh 
Pd 
AS 
Cd 
I n  
Sn 
Sb 
Te 
c s  
Ba 
La 
Ce 
Pr 
Nd 
Pni 
Sm 
E U  
Gd 
Tb 
DY 
Ho 
Er 
U 
NP 
Pu 
Am 
Cm 
Density 
O f  
Element 
(gm/cc) 
5.32 
5.73 
4.28 
1.53 
0.254 
4.47 
6.5 1 
8.57 
10.22 
11.5 
13.41 
12.41 
11.01 
10.50 
8.65 
7.3 1 
5.75 
6.69 
6.1-4 
1.87 
3.5 
6.15 
6.66 
6.64 
6.80 
7.40 
5.24 
7.90 
8.23 
8.55 
8.80 
9.07 
18.95 
20.25 
19.84 
13.67 
13.51 
- 
Th erm a 1 
Conductivity 
of Element 
( W / m  O K )  
33.8 ( u . 5 0 0  
18.2 (;c 500 
0.528 (ic: 300 
- 
1 I3 
28 
18 
21 
56.7 
130 
49.8 
113 
140 
75.5 
413 
92 
37 .1  
30.1 
19.4 
- 7  
20.5 
18.4 
16.3 
15 
14.7 
17.3 
18.5 
13.5 
14:2 
10.4 
11.4 
14.1 
14 
31.7 
6.3 
6.74 
9.28 
- 
Melting 
Point of 
Element 
("C) 
93 7 
817 
217 
39 
769 
1523 
1851 
2468 
2617 
2172  
1310 
1966 
1557 
90 7 
33 1 
157 
23 2 
63 1 
350 
38 
715 
930 
798 
93 1 
1010 
I080 
1072 
81 2 
131 1 
1360 
1409 
i 470 
1527 
i 133 
640 
64 1 
994 
1340 
Stability of Element" 
Rather stable 
Rather uti st ab le 
Burns at  elevated 
temperatures 
Very unstable 
Very unstablc 
Rather unstable 
Very stable 
Oxidizes a t  high temperature 
Oxidizes a t  high temperature 
Rather unstable 
Oxidizes a t  high temperature 
Oxidizes at red heat 
Very stable 
Very stable 
Burns at  elevated 
temperatures 
Stable 
Oxidizes 
BLII-I~S at elevated 
te m perat urus 
Oxid ixs  
Very unstable 
Very unstable 
Rather unstable 
Unstable 
Rather unstable 
Rat he r u n st a b 1 e 
Rather unstable 
Rather 11 ns t a b le 
Un  stab le 
Rather unstable 
Rather unstable 
Rather Litistable 
Rather unstable 
Rather unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstabie 
Uti s t ab le 
Uti st able 
a. With respect t o  air and watcr attack at  elevated temperatures. 
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To minimize the number of space flights required, we proceed under the 
assumption that separation of the waste into subfractions is an integral part of the space 
disposal scheme. It will also be assumed that the plutonium, if it is removed, will.either 
be recycled as reactor fuel or sent to space if desired. This separation could proceed as 
follows. 
The present technology calls for water storage for cooling of spent reactor rods 
for 6 months to  1 year. At that time the rods are mechanically chopped into small pieces 
and leached with nitric acid. This process removes some of the mass of the rods. The 
cladding hulls are eliminated2 and certain gasses (Xe and Kr) as well as low boiling point 
elements (Br and I) are eliminated. Standard treatment, as detailed in Reference 8, 
removes 99.5 percent of the uranium and plutonium. 
Removal of the cladding will eliminate one-fourth to one-third of the initial mass. 
The mass loss of the dissolved waste during processing (per metric ton of charged 
uranium) is as follows: 
(1) 99.5 percent of uranium removed: Removes 95.12 percent of initial mass 
(2) 99.5 percent of plutonium removed: Removes 23.25 percent of residual mass 
left at the end of step 1. 
(3) 100 percent of xenon removed: Removes 11.26 percent of residual mass left 
at the end of step 2. 
(4) 100 percent of kryton removed: Removes 1.34 percent of residual mass left 
at the end of step 3. 
(5) 99.5 percent of iodine removed: Removes 0.503 percent of residual mass left 
at the end of step 4. 
(6) 99.5 percent of bromine removed: Removes 0.010 percent of residual mass 
left at the end of step 5. 
The original waste mass has thus been reduced from approximately 1.3 X lo6  gm 
(including cladding hulls) to 3.3 X lo4 gm, a reduction factor of approximately 40. Since 
space payloads tend to  be mass limited, this reduction is critical, and such reduction can 
be accomplished by present day technology. This discussion illustrates the importance of 
~ 
2. It should be noted that the cladding hulls are contaminated by actinides (alpha activity) 
as well as fission fragments. It appears that this activity can be essentially eliminated by 
use of electro-polishing the fabricated hulls (before or after usage) and subsequent nitric 
acid washing during the reprocessing. 
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trade studies in the space disposal scheme. The fate of the uranium is eventual recycle. 
Plutonium could be recycled to  the reactor or carried to  space. Xenon is not radioactive 
and is chemically inert; it may be used industrially or dispersed as desired. Kryton is 
radioactive (half life of 10.6 years) and may be stored, used industrially, or carried to  
space. Space disposal of kryton is certainly possible and will be discussed at a later time. 
The bromine is not radioactive after a very short time and can be used or disposed of in 
an approved manner for chemically toxic waste. Iodine presents a special health hazard in 
that it is radioactive with a half life of 1.7 X lo7 years and is concentrated by living 
organisms, primarily in the pituitary gland. It could form a separate space payload in 
itself, as is discussed later. 
Certain waste mixes3 which have been considered in the space disposal study are 
defined in this section, with the advantages and disadvantages presented. One point, 
which is potentially confusing at this stage of the discussion (to be detailed later), is the 
use of the term “problem elements.” These are elements which pose special corrosion 
and/or volatilizing properties. Their elmination from the waste mix, while not required, 
would greatly simplify packaging. 
1. Mix 1. Mix 1 is the minimal treatment case. The spent rods are removed from 
the reactor and sent to  space with no treatment other than age cooling. This mixture is 
considered unsuitable for space disposal because it is simply too massive for transport 
(i.e., high flight numbers). Further, it has an unfavorable energy penalty and poor 
economics. It does have the advantage of requiring no chemical processing. This mix 
contains all problem elements. 
2. Mix 2. Mix 2 requires some processing. The rods are chopped and leached 
with nitric acid and the cladding hulls are thus removed. The uranium and plutonium are 
then removed, and the plutonium is returned to  the waste mix. Using present technology, 
it is not possible to  remove only uranium. (Work is underway on advanced separation 
schemes that would remove only uranium.) In the process, krypton, xenon, iodine, and 
bromine are also removed. T h s  mixture has one distinct advantage, namely it employs 
present processing technology yielding a massive weight loss compared to  Mix 1. Thus, it 
can be handled with a reasonable number of space flights (flight densities will be 
discussed in Section VIII.) The disadvantages of the mixture include a rather high mass 
[compared with other mixes to  be discussed), a high thermal density (Table 2 ) ,  and a 
high gamma and neutron flux. The requirement that plutonium be removed (together 
with the uranium) and then added bacK to the mlxrure means that (in the standard case) 
there is a time point at which isolated plutonium exists, i.e., a possibility of theft exists. 
3. The waste mixes defined in this section are designated as Mixes 1, 2, 3,  4, 4A, 4B, 4C, 
5 ,  5A, 6, 7, 8, and 9. These designations have grown historically and have not been 
renumbered in order t o  retain consistency with previously published material. 
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The problem is minimal, however, in that the form of the plutonium (a liquid) is 
unsuitable for transport and isolation of plutonium would occur only under extremely 
inaccessible conditions. This mix contains all of the problem elements. 
3. Mix 3. Mix 3 is simply Mix 2 without the readdition of removed plutonium. 
It has advantages over Mix 2 in that there is a further reduction of mass and the mixture 
has a lower thermal density. There would also be some reduction in neutron flux (but 
not gamma radiation) as compared to  Mix 2. It must be assumed that the removed 
plutonium will be used as a nuclear fuel, i.e., the plutonium cannot be buried because it 
is one of the chief hazards to  the biome. This mix, as with Mixes 1 and 2, is current 
technology, but it contains all of the problem elements. 
4. Mix 4. Mix 4 is a refinement of Mix 3. Several submixes will be defined for 
convenience. These represent subtractions of specific elements or groups of elements from 
Mix 3. 
5 .  Mix 4A. Mix 4A is Mix 3 with the removal of zirconium, molybdenum, and 
niobium. These elements are removed for several reasons. First of all, they are at worst, 
only very mildly radioactive (Zr, Nb) and present no  appreciable hazard for geologic 
disposal. Second, they are rather easily separated from the residual mass under conditions 
of present technology and, although niobium is present only in very small quantities, the 
mass of zirconium and molybdenum are extremely large in relationship to  the other 
fission products. Indeed, these elements form >21 percent of the entire mass of Mix 3 .  
This is a very significant reduction. 
6.  Mix 4B. Another element which can be left on Earth with little hazard and 
which is a tempting chemical target from the separation point of view is cerium. Cerium 
constitutes 7.2 percent of Mix 3. (If it were to  be removed in addition to  Zr, Nb, Mo, 
the total mass reduction of Mix 3 would be approximately 28.4 percent.) Cerium does 
present one major chemical processing problem in that it is almost always separated in 
the +4 valence state. This implies oxidizing conditions which generate difficult corrosion 
problems. The radioactive isotope of cerium, 8Ce' 44 is a strong gamma emitter but has 
a half life of only 289 days. It could be readily stored geologically. Mix 4B is defined as 
Mix 4A without cerium. 
7 .  Mix 4C. It is also desirable to  remove other elements which contribute heavily 
to the bulk of the wastes - yet which present no major toxicity hazard if they were to 
remain on Earth. Some of these elements, along with the pros and cons of their 
separation, will be discussed. It will be found that Mix 4C is a compromise between what 
could be eliminated in theory and what can be eliminated in practice. During the 
discussion it should be remembered that separation of a waste product from the bulk of 
the wastes entails at least three aspects. The first aspect is that the separated product 
must be exceedingly clean of long lived isotopes (i.e., very low activity) if it is to be 
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disposed of on Earth or utilized as an industrial resource. The second aspect is that the 
chemistry must be quite simple and thus not result in side stream contamination that 
would result in a growth of the gross waste volume. The third aspect (that ameliorates 
the first two to  some extent) is that residue of a removed element in the remaining waste 
is harmful onlyinsofar as it adds mass to  that waste. Thus, a cut that removes 50 percent 
of an inert element from the waste and does so cleanly and simply is a definite gain. The 
only caveat is that we cannot have contamination of the residue waste which is to  remain 
on Earth. 
a. Uranium. Although 99.5 percent of the initial uranium has been removed from 
the initial wastes, uranium is still the largest single component of the waste. If it could be 
completely removed, 13.9 percent of the mass would be eliminated. This could be simply 
readded to  the originally cut uranium. 
b. Neodymium and Lanthanum. These are inert and their terrestrial usage and/or 
disposal would present no problem. But they are rare-earths and as such are virtually 
impossible t o  remove except in conjunction with removal of all rare-earths. While they 
constitute 15.7 percent of Mix3, this cut is not realistic and shall not be considered. 
c. Ruthenium, Rhodium, and Palladium. All elements of this group are noble 
metals with extremely complicated chemistry (Ruthenium exhibits more valence states 
than any other element of the periodic table; rhodium is not much better.) The reasons 
for their removal are many. Ruthenium, for example, tends to  be quite volatile and 
presents vapor pressure problems that hamper container design. (It is a chief “problem 
element.”) The ruthenium-rhodium decay chain gives birth to  Rh’ which is an 
especially nasty gamma emitter - indeed, it sizes the gamma ray shield to a large extent. 
Thus, its presence is far more costly to the mass of the final system than is indicated by 
the small mass quantity of the element which is present. The sum of three elements 
constitute approximately 11.5 percent of the mass of Mix 3 and thus are also a heavy 
weight penalty. These elements are of important industrial potential - they are used as 
catalysts, jewelry, and applications wherein corrosion resistance is critical. (The U.S. 
depends upon importation of the needed supplies, much of it from Russia.) Finally, 
ruthenium and rhodium have short half-lives and could be readily stored until they are 
used. Palladium is mildly radioactive with a half-life of 7 X lo6  years for one isotope. 
From this discussion it is apparent that there is ample reason to  remove these elements 
from the waste. The technology, while not presently available, probably could be 
developed. 
d. Barium. Barium is a large constituent of the wastes (4.6 percent) and is a 
strong gamma emitter. But the gamma emission isotope ( 5  Ba’ M, is driven by cesium 
so that the removal of barium would not decrease the gamma shield requirements. If 
barium could be removed without contaminating it with strontium or other elements, 
such a cut is highly desirable from the mass reduction point of view. 
I II I 111 I1111111 II I 111 I 
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There are other components of the waste mixture that could be eliminated for 
Earth-usage/disposal but they occur in sufficiently small quantities that the trouble in 
extracting them is probably not returned in reduced payload requirements. 
To summarize, if zirconium, molybdenum, niobium, cerium, uranium, ruthenium, 
rhodium, palladium, and barium can be eliminated from Mix 3, the mass of waste to be 
carried could be reduced by approximately 59 percent and the residual Earth hazard 
would still be approximately zero. Even partial elimination of these elements would have 
a beneficial effect in proportion to  the percent elimination. For purposes of notation we 
define Mix 4C as Mix 3 with all nine of the above listed elements removed. 
8. Mix 5. Mix 5 represents a rather strong break with the previous cases in that 
most of the waste (including certain radiologically toxic isotopes) are left on Earth. Mix 
5 is the sum of the rare-earth elements and the actinide elements (excluding cerium, 
uranium, and plutonium). The separation required to  achieve this split is not simple and 
would have to  result from development work to  guarantee a significantly lowered hazard 
index for the waste left on Earth. 
The first advantage of this mix is that i t  is of relatively low mass (approximately 
46 percent of Mix 3). If we assume that uranium and cerium are also removed, in toto, 
then it is only approximately 25 percent of the mass of Mix 3. Furthermore, this mix 
removes almost all of the long-term toxicity for the nuclear wastes. (The biologically 
hazardous long-lived alpha emitters of the actinide isotopes are included in Mix 5.) It 
should be noted that although the separation of the lanthanides (rare-earths,) and 
actinides from the wastes is difficult, this separation is much easier than separating either 
of the two from each other. Nonetheless, an important difference is that this mix 
requires virtually complete separation of the waste to be carried from the waste which is 
to be left. This is a more difficult problem than a process which separates much of an 
inert waste from a mix that is t o  be carried to  space. 
9. -- Mix 5A. Mix SA is a very different approach to the entire problem of waste 
separation. For reasons that will be discussed elsewhere, the physical heat which is 
produced by isotope decay is a driver in the design of a space transport system. In 
particular, melting of the wastes and evaporation of low boiling point components are 
special problems (due, in large measure, t o  the problem elements). In Mix 5A a physical 
separation of the wastes rather than a chemical one is assumed. The wastes are simply 
allowed to  heat up (or are externally heated) to  drive off all of the volatile elements. 
This process is not as simple as it sounds since corrosion of the physical plant is a 
problem. (Perhaps all-graphite equipment could be used and then burned to CO, and the 
residue recycled.) Thus, Mix 5A assumes that all relatively volatile elements have been 
boiled off (Ge, As, Se, Rb, Ru, Cd, Te, Cs, are good candidates - with others added or 
subtracted according to  the oxidation state). There is not necessarily a total weight 
reduction with respect to Mix 3, because the two components would be sent to  space 
with different packaging concepts. Nonetheless, a simplified engineering design would 
result for the package. 
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10. Mix 6. Mix 6 is a further refinement of Mix 5. In this case only the actinide 
group (Np, Am, Cu) is removed for space elimination. The actinides were the payload 
and thermal power source for the previously studied NEWSTAR concept (NEWSTAR 
utilized the decay heat from the actinides to operate thermionic generators for an electric 
thrust vehicle ) [ 2 ]  . 
The primary difficulty with this mix is the very difficult chemical separation 
involved. That is, if space disposal is used to shorten the geoiogic storage time required 
for Earth isolation of nuclear wastes, then separation of the long lives alpha emitters 
must be virtually complete. If, for example, a 99 percent separation of the actinides from 
the fission fragments (a difficult task) could be achieved, the residual 1 percent actinides 
would require storage conditions that are not significantly less stringent than if no 
actinide separation had occurred. If all of the neptanium, americium, and curium could 
be eliminated, they would constitute only 1.9 percent of the mass of Mix 3. 
11. Mix 7 .  Mix 7, iodine, should be considered as a “supplementary mix” in that 
it would fly in conjunction with other mixes. The long lived isotope, I’ 9 ,  is a prime 
biological hazard because it concentrates in the pituitary gland. It is readily separable (to 
99.5 percent) from the other wastes. It could be transported as barium iodate, Ba(I03)2, 
and seems to  present virtually no difficulties from either the thermal point of view or 
with respect to radiation shielding. It represents only 1 percent of the mass of Mix 3 [as 
Ba(I03 1 . 
12. Mix 8. This mix, 6 C 1 4 ,  is the only presently considered mix that is not, per 
se, a direct result of the irradiation of uranium. This product is formed by the irradiation 
of nitrogen atoms (which are impurities in the fuel elements) by neutrons. It is a health 
hazard because carbon easily enters biologic chains. Although the C’ formed is of very 
small quantity, the material might be diluted with inert carbon. No estimate of the 
fraction of Mix 3 will be made, but it is a small number. 
13. Mix 9. Mix 9 consists of only technetium. Technetium represents a biologic 
hazard because it tends to concentrate in the thyroid and because it “creeps” rapidly in 
geologic storage. The element would form a nearly ideal payload because it emits only 
beta radiation and has a very low thermal density. The primary difficulty is sufficient 
removal of technetium from the residual wastes to lower the hazard index. Current 
technology (approximately 94 percent removal) is of little value. Technetium constitutes 
approximately 2.5 percent of Mix 3 .  
A final payload (that is not a “mix,” per se) was mentioned earlier. It is 
radioactive krypton gas which is separated from the other fission products at the initial 
leaching of chopped reactor rods. This gas has a half-life of 10.6 years. It is a strong beta 
emitter. Because the gas could not be transported as a component of the other mixes, it 
must be carried as a separate payload if space disposal is desired. The transportation of 
cryogenic liquid gasses is standard in the aerospace industry, and, as such, it could be 
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handled. The unique feature of this particular payload is that it is self-heating (due to 
radioactive decay). No design work has been accomplished for such a payload, yet it 
appears to be possible to transport it  to space. 
These mixes comprise the groupings that have been identified thus far as potential 
candidates for waste disposal in space. Although many of them do  not rely on present 
technology, it should be remembered that, when necessary, processing chemistry has 
developed extremely simple, reliable, and efficient cut procedures (for example uranium 
and plutonium separations). If the decision is made to employ space disposal, there could 
be corresponding new processing, Le., the preference might be not to employ methods 
which have been custom tailored to geologic disposal. Which of these mixes is optimal 
with respect to overall constraints is yet to be determined. 
Table 2 lists the thermal density of each waste mix. 
TABLE 2.  THERMAL DENSITY OF EACH WASTE MIX 
Mix No. 
1 
2 
3 
4A 
4B 
4c 
5 
5A 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Thermal Density 
(W/" 
0.00131 
0.0379 
0.03 14 
0.0398 
0.04389 
0.0543 
0.0130 
0.0299 
0.095 1 
-0 
-0 
-10-5 
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D. Definition of Required Level of Partitioning 
As was stated in the previous section, a distinction must be made between 
separation of an inert waste product from the mass of nuclear waste and the separation 
of a toxic waste from the same mass. 
If an inert element is separated from the waste, any residue of the element 
remaining with the bulk of the waste is harmful only because it increases the mass of the 
residue. In this sense, the elimination of even a small percentage of an inert substance is 
valuable for the space option if it can be accomplished simply and at low cost. This is 
the philosophy that was adopted in the outline of Mixes 2, 3, 4, 4A, 4B, and 4C. 
Mixes 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 were the converse problem in that the material that was 
to be sent to  space was eliminated from the residue, and this residue remained on Earth. 
Consider Mix 6 as a specific example. In this case the actinide elements (neptunium, 
americium, and curium primarily) are eliminated from the waste and only these elements 
are sent to space. The question is not whether most of the actinides can be eliminated 
from the residue, but rather what percentage of actinides will remain in the waste. 
Two constraints support the argument that a significant percentage of the 
actinides will remain behind. The first constraint is economic because such separations are 
expensive. The second constraint is technological in that processing is a diffusing 
(entropic) process. Some loss of material must be expected at each stage of separation; 
therefore, this may well be a virtually impossible problem to solve because the residue 
becomes increasingly free of the removed component. 
The most reasonable definition of a “required level of partitioning” is that it is 
that level which significantly reduces the residual hazard for material left on Earth below 
that which would occur if space transportation of waste were not employed. By this 
definition it can be seen that elimination of, e.g., 99 percent of the actinides would be of 
little value. The residual 1 percent still poses a high toxicity risk. 
The sum of these considerations leads to a choice of either Mix 1, Mix 2, or Mix 
3 for space elimination. Mix 1 has been previously ruled out on energy grounds; 
therefore, the choice is Mix 2 or Mix 3. Mixes 4, 4A, 4B, and 4C could still be 
considered but only if they are proven out by future experimental programs. Mix 7 
(iodine) and Mix 8 (C14) together with krypton could be carried as supplementary 
payloads. 
It is concluded that Mixes 2 and 3 are reasonable for space transportation. 
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E. Waste Forms 
While in the previous section the specific constituents that could be contained in 
the waste under different levels of treatments were considered, a major consideration' that 
has yet to be addressed is the chemical form in which the wastes are to be carried. This 
is important because the overall system design will depend upon the physical properties 
of the chemical form of the waste. 
A few general characteristics can be listed as desirable: 
(1) Mass density - Since the waste must be wrapped in heavy gamma ray 
shielding (and possible neutron shielding), it is of prime importance that as high a mass 
density as possible be achieved. Depending upon the geometry chosen and the amount of 
waste carried, the loss of one point in density can cost as much as 1500 kg in gamma 
shield weight for the configurations studied. It should be noted, however, that a higher 
mass density implies a higher thermal density per unit volume since the thermal output 
per gram of waste is a function only of age of the waste. Virtually every major subsystem 
of the waste disposal vehicle is ultimately dependent upon waste density. 
(2) Thermal conductivity - The thermal conductivity of the mixture should be 
as high as possible. This is necessary to keep the central temperatures of the waste mix to 
reasonable levels. Other things being equal, conductivity would be expected to  increase 
with increasing mass density. 
(3) Melting point/vapor pressure - The mixture should have a melting point that 
is as high as possible. Additionally, there should be very low vapor pressure from the 
mixture to avoid container stress and possible rupture. It should be noted that if a high 
thermal conductivity can be had, the melting point/vapor pressure criterion becomes less 
important and conversely. 
(4) Corrosive behavior - The waste form should be benign with respect to 
container material attack. This requirement can be offset by a careful choice of the 
container material. 
(5) Environmental stability - The chosen waste form must meet stringent 
requirements in the extremely improbable case that the containment is ruptured. This 
means that the material should not be combustible at  high temperatures in the 
atmosphere and should not dissolve either in freshwater or saltwater, even a t  elevated 
temperatures. Furthermore, the waste form should not be dispersable if rupture occurred 
upon impact. 
These characteristics are extremely stringent and it should not be assumed that all 
of them will be met; indeed, it seems unlikely that any one of them will be fulfilled in 
a completely satisfactory manner. 
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1. Physical Properties. Several candidate waste forms have been considered and 
are discussed individually. 
a. Elemental State. A number of properties of the fission products and 
actinides in the elemental state are listed in Table 1. It should be noted that the densities 
and thermal conductivities are high. While both of these features are very desirable, the 
elemental state cannot be seriously considered for several reasons. First, the resultant 
mixture (hardly an alloy) contains a large number of environmentally unstable elements. 
The mixture could not be expected to behave better than its components and would 
probably do much worse. Besides corrosion stability it would be expected to be brittle 
and probably heterogeneous. The elemental state has not been studied for waste 
products, and the development of such a form would undoubtedly be quite expensive. 
The elemental state is ruled out. 
b. Glasses. One of the standard waste forms which 
investigated for geologic disposal is the conversion of waste into a 
and the incorporation of these oxides into phosphate or borosilicate 
has several advantages: it is very resistant to oxidation and/or 
standard technology. The waste loading is low (approximately 25 
mass of the glass), therefore, the thermal density of the product 
have been carefully 
calcine (oxide) form 
glasses. This material 
dispersion and it is 
percent of the total 
is low. (The thermal 
conductivity is also low, as would be expected.) The low density of waste loading is the 
very factor which eliminates the possibility of using this waste form for space disposal. 
That is, the fact that approximately three-fourths of the mass is inert material 
immediately implies an increase of four times the space flights. This fact rules out glass 
waste forms for space. 
c. Alternate Anions. Alternate anions in this case means nonoxide anions. 
Oxides, the standard form of nuclear waste, have been given considerable study but 
alternatives such as borides, carbides, and nitrides have been virtually ignored since there 
has been no need for them. These alternates (especially the borides) may have much to 
offer; however, difficulty arises in dealing with this branch of chemistry because it is 
virtually unknown. Certain literature [ 91 indicate that borides of some (probably all) 
rare-earths have a high thermal conductivity; however, most other needed data are 
missing. Furthermore, fabrication difficulties would probably be severe. The summary of 
the alternate anion concept is that there is simply not enough information to intelligently 
evaluate the concept. If enough interest is shown in space disposal, an entire research 
program could evaluate these compounds, but it is probably unnecessary. For the present 
time, they must be shelved. 
d. Oxides. The waste oxides must be considered as the only practical form 
for space transportation. On the positive side it must be realized that existing processing 
can produce mixed oxides, and the properties of such a mixture have been partially 
investigated. The mass density of the oxides (2.5 to 4 gm/cc) is low, however, and the 
thermal conductivity is very poor (on the order of 0.6 to 1.8 W/m°K). The melting point 
and vapor pressure vary strongly with the specific element involved. The oxides and some 
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of their properties are presented in Table 3. One immediate result of this table is to 
indicate that although a large number of oxides are known to exist, many of their 
properties have not been experimentally determined [ 10,113. The measurements of 
thermal conductivity are especially sparse. Additional data from this table show that 
although the individual oxides have rather high densities, these data are theoretical values 
for ordered crystals. Admixtures of oxides will not be nearly as high. 
The listing of solubility of the oxides per 100 cc of hot water (the waste would 
heat water if contact occurs) indicates a rather high solution rate. Thus, oxides are not 
resistant to dissolution in many cases. Similarly, the oxides that are listed cannot be 
expected to  remain in an unmodified state. Many of the listed oxides convert to other 
forms in the presence of oxygen, while some oxides release oxygen. 
An even more striking occurrence is the fact that other compounds (other than 
oxides) will necessarily form in the oxide mixture. The most obvious of these compounds 
are molybdenates of the alkali and alkaline Earth metals. Interactions of this type 
essentially preclude completely theoretical calculations of waste oxide properties and we 
must rely on experimental determination of the waste properties. 
Experimental determinations suffer from a lack of published results. The situation 
is further complicated by the fact that different type reactors will each produce (slightly) 
varying products and, finally, the waste mixture changes in time. Baseline values were 
accepted as follows: 
Thermal conductivity: 0.6 to 1.8 W/m “K 
Thermal density: See Table 2 
Density: 4.0 gm/cm3 
Melting point: On the order of 1000°C 
Corrosive behavior: Oxidizing 
Environmental stability: Better than the individual oxides. 
The limiting factors of the oxide are the low thermal conductivity and the 
environmental dispersion potential of these compounds. An alternative “packaging” 
method that retains the oxide baseline yet largely overcomes these drawbacks is the metal 
matrix concept. The concept employs a continuous network of fine metal connectors 
that enmeshes the nuclear waste oxides within it. Each element of waste is thus only a 
very short distance from a metallic thermal conductor and the inherent conductivity of 
the waste becomes of little importance. The thermal control and environmental stability 
of the overall configuration become a function of the metal chosen to act as a matrix. A 
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TABLE 3. OXIDES AND SOME OF THEIR PROPERTIES 
Element 
Ge 
As 
Se 
Rb 
Sr 
Y 
Zr 
Nb 
Mo 
Tc 
Ru 
Rh 
Pd 
AE 
Cd 
In 
Sn 
Sb 
Te 
Density 
(gni/c.c) 
4.7 
6.3 
3.87 
4.09 
3.95 
3.6 
3.72 
3.80 
3.53 
4.7 
4.84 
5.56 6.37 
7 26 
5.98 
4.95 
4.1 I 
4 69 
6.97 
3 29 
8.2 
8 7  
7.14 
6.95 8.15 
6.99 
7.18 
6.45 
6.95 
5.2 
3.8 4.0 
3.78 
Solubility of 
Oxide 
(gin/ IO0 cc 
Hot H 2 0 )  
1.07 
i 
76.7 
10.1 
82.5 
d 
d 
d 
d 
22.9 
I 
I 
2.06 
I 
2.25 
I 
I 
I 
0.005 
I 
I 
I 
i  
s1.s 
V.Sl.S 
v.sl.s 
I 
I 
Melting Point 
of Oxide 
( O C )  
710 
1116 
1116 
586 
>825 
1100 
340 390 
I I9 
627 
570 
489 
41 2 
2430 
41& 450 
- 
2376 
2690 
350 
I945 
3001 
1772 
1510 
1927 
>700 
>700 
>700 
795 
2137 
I 2 0  
1127 
25 
1388 
1127 
1121  
877 
1 8 7  
0.826 
1052 
327 
2000 
I042 
1625 
655 
930 
380 
747 
733 
Thcrmal 
Conductivity 
of Oxide 
( W / m  "K) 
0.3 
2.3 (at IOO0"C) 
0 (18 ( a t  47°C) 
5.6 
Comments on  Tlicrtnal Stability 
Sublimes >700°C. Decotn poses >600"C 
Evdporates appreciably > I  250°C 
Ev.tporates appreciably > I  250'C 
Sublimes readily 
Decomposes to As203 at 3 15°C 
Stable only as vapor at high temperature. 
Sublinies readily 
Decomposes above 185°C 
Decomposes 
Melts without decomposition 
Unstable: decomposes 
Melts without decomposition 
Decomposes >567'C 
Stable 
Decomposes to SrO at 700" 800°C 
Decomposes 
Stable 
Very stable 
Thermally unstable 
1-vaporates Jppreclably a t  - 1700°C 
F o r m  Nb205 on heating i n  air 
Therinally \table 
Partial sublimation a t  lO00"C. forms Moo3 and Mu. 
Tlierinally un5table. forms MOO? and Moo3 
Thermally un5table. forms Moo2 Jnd Moo3 
Tliermally i in\ table.  forms MOO? and o03 
Thermally unstable. forms Moo?  and Moo3 
Tliernially unstable,  rorliis Moo? and Moo3 
Tlicrnially unstable, forms MOO? and Moo3 
Thermally uii%tablc. forms MOO: and Mu03 
Sublitncs appreciably abovc 650°C 
- 
- 
- 
Suhlllnes a t  21°C 
I~ec.olllpures cxl'lorlvcly a t  108°C 
l>ccotiiposcs ~ b w c  IO00"C to t h e  inetal 
rliernially utirtablc 
Tlicrm;illy unstable 
Tlicriiially unstable 
Decomposes to elenicnts above 870°C 
Unstable a t  room temperature 
Cotirerts to PdO a1 200°C 
I)ec'oniposes conipletcly .!hove 300°C 
I.xtrcmcly unbtablc 
Sublimes a t  700°C witliouf melting 
Unstable. readily uses oxygen 
Sublimes i n  vacuum at 650 700°C 
Conv to In?O3 at 850°C. then I n 2 0  
Conv. t o  S n 0 2  a t  450°C 
Stable 
Sublimes readily 
Decomposes to Sb203 above 90OoC 
Stable to 357°C. Sb2 a1 higher 1enii)erdture 
Stdble only as vapor at 1iiL.i tciiiperature 
Sublinics a t  -450°C 
Decon1poses to elcn1ents ilt I0O0C. Expl. at I I 0 " C  
- 
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TABLE 3. (Concluded) 
Element 
c s  
Ba 
La 
Ce 
Pr 
Nd 
Pm 
Sm 
Eu 
Gd 
Tb 
DY 
Ho 
Er 
U 
NP 
Pu 
Am 
Cm 
Density 
(ginlcc) 
5.08 6.21 
4.25 
4.75 
5.72 
4.96 
6.51 
6.9 7.0 
7.13 
7.07 
6.82 
7.24 
7.4 
7.4 
7.4 I 
- 
7.41 
8.65 
10.5 
7.2 
5.02 
1 1 . 1 1  
b 
. b  
I I .46 
1 I .68 
- 
Solubility of 
Oxide 
(gm1100 cc 
Hot HzO) 
i 
d 
d 
90.8 
S 
d 
I 
I 
0.003 
v.sl.s 
i 
I 
I 
Melting Point 
of Oxide 
("C ) 
400 
490 
594 
502 
450 
1923 
450 
2300 
2157 
2427 
2290 
2042 
477 
2315 
- 
2320 
2330 
7395 
2337 
2385 
2395 
2400 
2760 
1450 
652 
23 27 
1017 
1607 
2240 
1952 
Thermal 
Coiiductivity 
of Oxide 
(W/m O K )  
- 
- 
0. I (at  I 50°C) 
2.96 (at 480°C) 
3.4 (at  IO00"C) 
25.5 (at 60OOC) 
0.35 
Comments on Thermal Stability 
Decomposes to  TeO2 above 300°C 
Evaporation begins of 550°C 
Melts without decomposition 
Decomposes above 597°C 
Stable in absence of oxygen 
Decomposes t o  BaO 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stable 
Thermally stablc 
Stable over 650' to 900°C. Decomposes a t  1450°C 
Decomposes at 450°C 
Stable to 1000°C 
Decomposes at 600°C to  form NpO? 
- 
- 
Decompose in vacuum to  PmZOj 
Stable to 1000°C 
Pu407 - 
- 
a. Not listed in the "Handbook of Physics and Chemistry." 54th edition. Chemical Rubber Publishing Company. 
Cleveland. bh io  
b. Not listed in "The Oxide Handbook." edited by C. V. Samsonoi. Plenum Press. New York, 1973. 
Note: s soluble 
i - insoluble 
d decomposes 
s1.s slightly soluble 
v.sI.s ~ very slightly soluble 
number of metals have been suggested (such as molybdenum, copper, lead, and 
aluminum), and experiments have been carried out with a number of these. Some results 
are shown in Figure 4 and Table 4.4 
The important questions that arise with respect to a metal matrix for space 
disposal are whether or not the metal can occupy a sufficiently small volume and mass 
percentage of the package that the method can be used for space transportation. It was 
found4 that careful fabrication of such a composite can decrease the volume percentage 
4. Personal communication with W. Pardue of Battelle Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio. 
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Figure 4. Thermal conductivity versus temperature for UOz cermets 
and their matrix metals. 
of the metal to approximately 10 percent while retaining a conductivity of the same 
order of magnitude as the metal. The question of mass percentage, once the volume 
percentage has been fixed, is then a function of the density of the matrix metal. A metal 
such as beryllium, which is quite light and of high thermal conductivity, would be ideal 
- but questions of interaction between this metal and the waste oxides are not answered. 
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TABLE 4. DESCRIPTION OF SPECIMENS USED FOR PHYSICAL-PROPERTY MEASUREMENTS 
Specimen 
TC-8 1 
TC-80 
TC- 1 02 
TC- 1 03 
TC-82 
TC-9 0 
TC-105 
TC- 1 04 
TC-115 
TC-130 
Nominal 
Composition 
(volume %) 
uOz-30 stainless 
U02-20 stainless 
UOz -20 stainless 
U 0 2  -20 stainless 
UO2-3O molybdenum 
UOZ-20 molybdenum 
U02-20 molybdenum 
UOz -20 chromium 
U 0 2  -20 niobiume 
UOz -20 niobiumf 
Density 
(% of theoretical) 
97.0 
95.5 
98.4 
97.2 
91.7 
91.1 
94.4 
97.1 
85.3 
93.5 
Thermal 
Conductivity 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Physical Properties Measured 
Linear 
Expansion 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
- 
- 
a. Electrical resistivity measured concurrently with thermal conductivity. 
b. Electrical resistivity measured independently of thermal conductivity. 
c. Not reported. 
d. Not calculated. 
e. Niobium-coated minus 100 plus 140-mesh spherical UOz . 
f. Niobium-coated minus 140 plus 200-mesh hydrothermal UOz , 
Electrical 
Resistivitya 
X 
X 
XC 
d 
X 
X 
d 
d 
X 
X 
Electrical 
Resistivityb 
2. Economics of Waste Forms. The previously mentioned considerations placed 
heavy emphasis upon the fact that waste oxides do exist and are standard technology. 
From this point of view, space disposal and geologic disposal are similar in that both 
begin with the same material. The costs of development of waste solidification to the 
oxide form could not justly be charged to space operations because these will exist in 
any case. 
Several items are uniquely space related, however. The packaging of the waste for 
space disposal (to be described later in this report) will require a very high density, and 
this compaction could require specialized equipment. The metal matrix has been 
developed to its present state-of-the-art by nonspace programs, but research for the 
space-op timized package would be necessary . 
Nonetheless, the costs borne in development of compaction techniques and metal 
matrix developments are quite small when compared to overall waste management costs. 
Only the undertaking of a major perturbation in the form of the wastes (i.e., nonoxides) 
could be expected to involve large sums for research and development. 
Based upon these considerations of economics as well as the earlier comments on 
technological feasibility, the recommended waste forms must be either oxides or oxides 
in a metal matrix. This recommendation is in addition to  the earlier choice that waste 
Mixes 2 or 3 be baselined for space disposal. 
The remaining problem of low thermal conductivity and dispersibility of the 
oxides are considered in Section IV. 
Recommended waste forms are oxides or oxides in a metal matrix. 
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Ill. SPACE OPTIONS 
The vastness of space offers many potential destinations for the placement of 
nuclear waste. Space offers options for both disposal where the waste is permanently 
removed from man's environment and storage where the waste may be retrieved at  a later 
time if i t '  is ever desirable to do so. Retrieval from space, except for the lunar soft 
landing mission, will be limited time wise by the container lifetime. The space 
destinations considered in this study are high Earth orbit (HEO), lunar orbit, lunar soft 
landing, heliocentric orbit, solar system escape, and solar impact. A comparison of the 
space destinations is presented in Figure 5. From launch to low Earth orbit (LEO) (160 
nmi .  altitude), the mission scenario is the same for all destinations; however, the launch 
rate is different. 
A. High Earth Orbit 
Placing the nuclear waste in HE0 requires the lowest AV (4000 m/s above 
Shuttle orbit) of all the destinations considered, and this is the main advantage of the 
HE0 orbit mission. Potentially, HE0 could serve as a storage or disposal site. One of the 
main concerns with the HE0 mission is orbit lifetime, and for this reason a high circular 
55 000 km orbit was considered. To transfer the nuclear waste payload from the 160 
n.mi. Shuttle orbit to the 55 000 km orbit requires two bums of the orbit transfer 
vehicle (OTV) main propulsion system, the second burn occurring approximately 15 h 
after the first burn. Thus, for the HE0 mission the required vehicle system lifetime is 
approximately 18 h from launch to mission completion. The orbital altitude of 55 000 
km was not optimized, but was picked because it was sufficiently high that aerodynamic 
drag was negligible and sufficiently low that lunar perturbation would be small. Also, it is 
desirable to  choose an orbit that would avoid interference with the planned scientific 
satellites in LEO and in geosynchronous space. Thus, the minimum orbit radius must be 
greater than 42 241 km (geosynch radius). A detailed stability analysis would be required 
if the H E 0  mission becomes a serious contender for nuclear waste storage/disposal. 
Launch for an HE0 mission can occur on any day and at any time of day. If 
specific placement in HE0  is required, it can be achieved by selecting the time of launch 
and by performing orbit phasing while in the Shuttle orbit (160 n.mi. altitude). 
The OTV can place 5900 kg of payload into a 55 000 km circular orbit inclined 
28.5" to the equator. However, the largest nuclear waste payload that can be carried by 
the Shuttle is 4408 kg. Thus, for the HE0 mission the payload to orbit is limited by the 
amount of nuclear waste (plus shielding, coccoon, and cooling equipment) that can be 
carried to LEO by the space Shuttle. 
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Figure 5 .  Space options. 
A failure during either of the OTV burns will leave the waste container in an 
Earth orbit from which the container can be retrieved by a rescue vehicle. After 
rendezvous and docking, the rescue vehicle can complete the mission by placing the 
container in the proper orbit. The inherent rescue capability that exists for the HE0  
mission is a plus for this option. 
In addition to orbital lifetime, the other concerns associated with the HE0 
options are ( 1 )  the sheer number of waste containers (280 to 582 depending on the mix) 
that would add to the already cluttered Earth orbital space, and (2) the possible 
reencounter of the nuclear waste particles with the Earth due t o  the influence of the 
solar wind. It is most unlikely that a waste canister can be constructed that will last for 
the required 250 000 years. The canisters will erode with time under the influence of 
internal radiation as well as space encountered radiation, and the solar wind could drive 
the small particles back into the Earth’s atmosphere. The dynamics of small particles 
under the influence of the solar wind is currently being investigated by Science 
Applications, Inc. Of all the space options considered, the HE0 option would probably 
be the last one to gain public acceptance. The idea of several hundred nuclear waste 
containers orbiting the Earth is not an appealing one. 
B. Lunar Orbit 
For a AV of approximately 4250 m/s, the OTV in a reusable mode can place 
4408 kg into a circular lunar orbit of radius 21 700 km. If this orbit is in the 
Earth/Moontravel plane, the result is an orbit that will exhibit orbital stability for 
extremely long periods of time. This type of lunar orbit has been analyzed using the 
“Surface of Section” method, and it was found that insertion errors of up to +7200 km 
in position and +61 m/s in velocity could be tolerated without affecting the orbital 
stability. Lunar orbit offers both storage and disposal options; however, retrieval of waste 
stored in lunar orbit is limited by the lifetime of the waste container. 
The flight profile for the lunar orbit mission is more complicated than the HE0 
mission and will require three bums of the OTV main propulsion system plus a small 
plane-change burn (4 m/s) and a midcourse correction utilizing the Reaction Control 
System (RCS). The particular baseline profile that was selected has high performance and 
low near term risk of Earth encounter in the event of a system failure. Thus, for system 
failures, rescue can be performed with a standby vehicle. A perigee burn near the Earth 
provides over 90 percent of the delta-velocity required for translunar injection and places 
the OTV plus payload in a highly eccentric intermediate orbit. The major axis and 
eccentricity of the intermediate orbit is limited so that, in the event of total system 
failure after the perigee burn, lunar and solar perturbations [ 121 will not cause the OTV 
to encounter the Earth before a waste-recovery mission can be executed. Near apogee of 
the intermediate orbit, a plane-change burn is made to make the inclination of the OTV 
orbit compatible with the translunar targeting requirements. This plane-change burn can 
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also be used to raise perigee, thereby producing an even more stable orbit in the event of 
system failure after the plane-change burn. Burn 3 supplies the additional velocity to 
place the OTV within the lunar sphere of influence and near the desired close approach 
to the Moon- The OTV's state at the beginning of this burn is accurately known as a 
result of over 17 h of tracking and orbit determination since the plane-change burn. A 
midcourse burn may or may not be required. Burn 5 places the OTV plus payload in 
lunar orbit. 
A propulsion system failure during the O W  perigee burn would leave the waste 
canister in a highly elliptic Earth orbit. Lunar perturbations, depending on the apogee 
radius, could be significant, thus rescue capability would be a requirement for this 
mission. A study was performed to determine the time required to  perform a rendezvous 
with a failed OTV. The time required 'to perform a rescue mission will depend on the 
relationship of the failed OTV with respect to the position of the rescue vehicle a t  the 
time of launch. Table 5 presents data where the aforementioned relationship has been 
parameterized from 0" to 320". The orbit considered for this analysis had a radius of 
perigee of 8222 km and a radius of apogee of 477 281 km. This represents an orbit with 
a larger apogee radius than would ever occur with the target biasing, as described earlier, 
and represents a worse case with respect to  rendezvous time. As shown in Table 5, the 
worst rendezvous geometry occurs when the failed OTV plus waste canister is at 240" 
true anomaly when the rescue Shuttle/OTV vehicle is launched. Even in this case the 
time required for rendezvous is only 8.8 days. Thus, rescue of a failed OTV/waste 
package could occur easily before the lunar perturbation could have a significant affect 
on the orbit. 
With time, it is possible that the canisters will erode away, and the small nuclear 
waste particles will be perturbed by the solar wind. This perturbation will possibly result 
in the nuclear waste impacting the Moon or even escaping the lunar gravitational field 
and reencountering the Earth. Due to  large distance involved, only a small percentage of 
the particles should reach the Earth. This problem is being investigated by Scientific 
Applications, Inc. 
C. Lunar Soft Landing 
Soft landing a nuclear waste canister on the lunar surface can be achieved with an 
expendable OTV for a AV of approximately 6053 m/s. This mission has several 
advantages over the lunar orbit mission. First, the lunar surface can serve as a permanent 
disposal site or a long term storage site because the waste could be retrieved from the 
lunar surface, if ever it is desirable to  do so, even if the containers erode away. Retrieval 
in such a case would require some form of collecting and repackaging the waste. Another 
advantage of this mission compared to HE0  or lunar orbit missions, is that if the waste 
containers erode with time, the nuclear waste will be confined to the lunar surface and 
will not be left in orbit where the solar wind can possibly return some of the waste 
particles to  Earth. The only way that waste could retum to Earth from the lunar surface 
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TABLE 5. NUCLEAR WASTE RENDEZVOUS DATA 
Perigee Intersection Phase Adjustment 
Orbit Insertion Orbit Insertion 
AV 
(mls) 
of Target 
When Inplane 
With Launch 
Site (deg) (n.mi.) 
Phase Initiation Point 
Total Time Total Tug 
from Lift- AV 
off (day) ( 4 s )  
AV 
(mls) 
392.5 
392.3 
HP 
(n.mi.) 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
94.2 
HA HP 
(n.mi.) (n.mi.) 
47 799.6 906.0 
48 042.1 905.6 
392.1 48 954.6 
392.2 48 789.6 
AV 
(mls) 
2885.2 
2887.0 
2893.5 
2892.3 
2667.9 
3010.3 
2879.9 
2892.6 
289 1.5 
905.2 
905.3 
Coelliptic Orbit I Rendezvous Terminal 
328.1 7.97 
326.6 7.97 
321.0 8.07 
Insertion 
3605.8 
3605.9 
3606.6 
HA 
(n.mi.) 
250 120 
250 819 
253 579 
254 161 
254 171 
254 171 
254 127 
253 827 
0 
40 
HP 
(n.mi.) 
900.8 
900.4 
900.0 
900.1 
‘900.0 
900.1 
900.0 
900.4 
91 5.4 
91 5.0 
252909 , 900.7 
would be as a result of meteoric impact, with some of the material achieving escape from 
the Moon and returning to Earth as a result of solar radiation pressure. The probability 
of the aforementioned happening is considered to  be small; if it did happen, the amount 
of waste reaching the Earth would be very small. 
The flight profile for the lunar soft landing mission would be very similar to  flight 
profile previously described for the lunar orbit mission and is shown in Figure 6. The 
main difference would be that burn 3 would place the OTV on a lunar impact course. 
Burn 5 would be a throttled burn which would soft land the OTV and the 
nuclear waste canister on the lunar surface. The OTV would strike the lunar surface in a 
near vertical, engine first position with near zero velocity. After impact the OTV would 
fall over and come to rest in a horizontal position on the lunar surface. 
The lunar impact point can easily be adjusted to  a large range of latitudes and 
longitudes with practically no AV penalty. However, as the site is moved toward the 
Earth-Moon-Line (EML) or to  the east of the EML, the downrange component of 
velocity becomes larger at impact. This fact implies that the effect of trajectory 
dispersion are larger to  the east of the EML. Thus, choosing a landing site west of EML 
will tend to minimize landing dispersions and allow the nuclear canisters to be confined 
to  a small area. 
The impact commit burn is the most critical bum in the baseline trajectory 
profile. A premature termination of this bum could produce an unsafe orbit, with lunar 
and solar perturbations causing the OTV to encounter the Earth before a recovery 
mission could be executed. A premature termination of any of the other burns would not 
produce such a result. The best that can be done in designing the trajectory profile is to  
assure that only one burn is critical from the standpoint of an early termination. The 
impact-commit bum is targeted to  produce an impact on the Moon at a steep angle of 
incidence to  minimize the probability of missing the Moon in the event of a system 
failure following the burn. 
The highly eccentric intermediate orbit that is produced by the long burn of 1120 
s will be perturbed by lunar and solar gravity as shown in Figure 7 if the OTV is left in 
the intermediate orbit as a result of a system failure. 
For the selected baseline trajectory profile and launch date, the intermediate 
orbit’s line of apsides is favorably oriented with respect to the Earth-Sun line for the 
gradual raising of the perigee. An unfavorable orientation of the line of apsides would 
produce a gradual lowering of the intermediate orbit’s perigee. By the proper selection of 
launch time and plane-change adjustment, a favorable orientation of the line of apsides 
can be obtained for a launch at any time of the year. A maximum rotation of the 
intermediate orbit’s line of apsides of approximately 45” will “move” the Sun into a 
favorable position. This could be accomplished by waiting approximately 3.5 days. 
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Figure 6. Flight profile for the lunar orbit mission. 
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The crater Billy, located at a longitude of 5OoW and a latitude of -14" was chosen 
as a preliminary disposal site. It is believed that this crater satisfies the conditions 
imposed by the preliminary reference trajectory and, at the same time, it is not near any 
other interesting lunar formations which might be explored at a later date. 
D. Solar Orbit 
Placing nuclear waste in an orbit in a region of space encircling the Sun, either 
outside or inside the Earth's orbit, would be a disposal option rather than a storage 
option, since for all practical purposes the waste could not be recovered. Retrieval would 
be expensive and would be limited by the lifetime of the canisters. Reference 13 presents 
data which indicated that a good choice for a solar orbit would be a circular orbit inside 
the Earth's orbit at 0.86 AU from the Sun. Figure 8 shows the long term variations in 
aphelion and perihelion and, as can be seen from this data, a 0.86 AU orbit 
demonstrates a high degree of stability. The AV above the Shuttle orbit required to 
achieve a 0.86 AU circular orbit is 4450 m/s, and the OTV, in a reusable mode plus a 
kick stage can place approximately 4408 kg in this orbit. The optimal trajectory for this 
mission is a Hohmann transfer which requires a burn at perihelion and aphelion. These 
burns occur approximately 6 months apart. This would place a 6 month lifetime 
requirement on the solid motor kick stage subsystems, which will affect the overall 
vehicle reliability. A failure to make the aphelion burn or a failure during the latter 
portion of the perihelion burn will leave the nuclear waste canister in a solar orbit with a 
perihelion equal to that of the Earth. Thus, there would exist the possibility of the 
nuclear waste reencountering the Earth at some time in the future. Figure 9 shows the 
increase in AV and the period of the resulting Earth-centered orbit as a function of OTV 
perihelion burn time. Earth escape occurs at approximately 1700 s, thus, a failure 
occurring during the first 1700 s would leave the nuclear waste payload in an Earth 
bound orbit while a failure after 1700 s would leave the waste in an elliptical solar orbit. 
In either case the payload would have to be rescued. Rescue in the latter case would be 
more difficult; however, there would be no immediate danger of reencountering the 
Earth. Thus, rescue would not have to be accomplished for several years. Data for Figure 
10 was taken from Reference 14, and it shows the probability of Earth collision versus 
OTV/solid kick stage system failure rates. Earth collision risk results from vehicle failures 
which are caused by a premature termination of thrust, or a failure of the solid kick 
stage to  ignite. The probability of Earth collision can be reduced by flying rescue 
missions. Standby vehicles could be used to rendezvous and dock with the nuclear 
payload, release the failed OTV or kick stage, and perform the necessary maneuvers to 
complete the planned mission. Note from Figure 10 that the probability can be reduced 
as low as desired by flying multiple rescue missions. Thus, the capability of rescuing a 
failed vehicle in heliocentric space should be a requirement for a solar orbit mission. An 
erosion of the canisters with time would release radioactive waste in heliocentric space. 
However, considering the vastness of space under consideration, the amount which could 
possibly return to  the Earth would be very small. If the contents of one canister were 
dispersed at 0.5 AU and then swept out to 1 AU, the amount encountered by the Earth 
would be at most, much less than 1 gm [SI.  Launch for a solar orbit mission is not 
constrained by a launch window. 
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E. Solar System Escape 
Sending nuclear waste to solar system escape guarantees permanent isolation from 
man’s environment. It cannot be retrieved and, therefore, cannot be considered as a 
storage option. For a nominal mission, the mission is completed a few hours after launch 
with a single burn of the propulsion system; therefore, required vehicle lifetime is a 
minimum for this mission. Also, container lifetime does not present a problem, and there 
are no launch time restrictions. The major disadvantage to the solar system escape 
mission is the 8750 m/s AV required. This high energy requirement limits the OTV’s 
payload to  687 kg per flight. Also, a failure during the OTV burn could leave the nuclear 
waste in a heliocentric orbit with a perihelion of 1 AU. Figure 11 shows the increase in 
AV and the period of the resulting Earth centered orbit as a function of OTV perihelion 
bum time. Earth escape occurs at approximately 1000 s, thus, a failure occurring during 
the last 800 s of the 1800 s burn time would result in a solar orbit from which rescue of 
the waste would be very difficult. The comments in Section D concerning the probability 
of Earth reencounter also apply to the solar system escape mission. 
F. Solar Impact 
Sending the nuclear waste into the Sun also guarantees permanent isolation from 
man’s environment. The previous comments concerning solar system escape generally 
apply to the solar impact mission. One major difference is that solar impact requires 
approximately 24 km/s AV. This AV is beyond the capability of current chemical 
propulsion systems, and a solar impact mission should be considered as impractical. 
G. Space Option Comparison 
All six of the space destinations investigated have certain advantages and 
disadvantages. As mentioned previously, the mission scenario from launch to LEO is the 
same for all missions except for the launch rate. The H E 0  mission would have the lowest 
launch rate and the solar system escape mission would require the highest launch rate. 
The solar orbit and the solar system escape missions have an abort gap that occurs after 
Earth escape velocity is achieved. A vehicle failure during this time would leave the 
nuclear canister in a heliocentric orbit with a probability of reencountering the Earth 
within 250 000 years of However, the probability of near term (10 to 20 years) 
encounter is extremely small, and more than adequate time is available for recovery of 
the waste canister. Flying one recovery mission with a reliability of 0.99 reduces the 
probability of encounter to flying two (if necessary) recovery missions will reduce 
the probability of encounter to lo-’, etc. Thus, a proven heliocentric recovery capability 
should be a requirement for either the solar orbit or the solar escape missions. The main 
disadvantage to the solar escape mission is the high AV requirement and consequent small 
payload. 
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The main concern associated with the HE0 mission is the long term stability of 
the orbit. The effects of lunar and solar gravitational perturbations, the solar wind, and 
possible high altitude atmospheric drag make the HE0 hard to  assess. Eventual erosion of 
the canisters will leave the uncontained waste in Earth orbit, and the actual spread is 
difficult to predict. 
The lunar orbit and lunar surface missions have potential upper stage failure 
conditions that could lead to  non-nominal orbits that are sensitive to  lunar and solar 
perturbations. Recovery capability would have to be demonstrated to protect against the 
rare but possible situation thatresults in orbits which are not stable for long periods of 
time. Studies have indicated that 10 days is sufficient time to perform a recovery 
mission. 
Figure 5 represents a comparison of the five potential space destinations. Except 
for the small payload, the solar escape mission is the most attractive mission. However, 
overall the best options are ( 1 )  the lunar surface and (2) solar orbit. 
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IV. NUCLEAR WASTE PACKAGING 
The previous discussions on the waste mix and waste form have described 
problems that cannot be resolved (due to economic and technological constraints) by the 
waste form itself. The method of packaging the material can, however, economically 
substitute for shortcomings in the waste form. 
The primary residual problems are thermal conductivity and dispersion in the case 
of waste oxide and a simple containment in the case of the metal matrix. Since the initial 
baseline was oxides (the metal matrix was “discovered” more recently), several 
compensatory designs were evolved which allowed the use of pure oxide mixtures. For 
this reason, such packaging is described with the understanding that it is an “overkill” for 
the metal matrix. 
A. Waste Canister 
The waste canister is the innermost wrap for nuclear waste and, therefore, must 
be made of a material which is chemically compatible with the waste oxides of either 
Mix 2 or Mix 3. Niobium was chosen as the metal because it is rather light (mass density 
of 8.57 gm/cm3) and has a high melting point (2468°C). It is also rather resistant to  
attack, although an oxidizing environment such as is envisioned is not acceptable. Prior 
NASA work on the use of niobium as a reentry shield developed silicide coating 
techniques for the metal that makes it virtually impervious to  oxygen attack. Thus, it 
seems to  be an acceptable material. 
The thickness of this particular portion of the container is important because, as 
will be discussed later, all niobium which is carried subtracts an equal amount from the 
payload. This dictates that the thinnest possible shell of niobium be used, and a value of 
0.625 cm was chosen. It should be noted that this shell is not to  withstand pressures. 
At this time, an assumption must be made as to the amount of waste that is to  
be carried on a given mission. The systems interaction is such that the amount chosen 
cannot yet be justified; it will be derived in Section VIII, based on the packaging 
assumptions made here. A nominal value of 1 m3 of waste oxide is chosen as the 
payload. 
Another look ahead is also required. The waste canister must be wrapped in a 
gamma ray shield as well as a mechanical protection wrap (see Sections 1V.B and C). These 
additional wraps around the canister will add a very large amount of mass to the overall 
system, and all of this mass must be transported to  space. For this reason, it becomes 
extremely important to shape the basic canister in such a way that the required 
additional packaging is a t  a minimum. 
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Two configurations were seriously considered: the right circular cylinder and the 
hemisphere. The right circular cylinder must be further specified by a fineness ratio, i.e., 
the ratio of length to diameter. It is obvious that a very long pencil-like cylinder or a 
very flat pancake-like cylinder would provide relief for the low conductivity of the waste 
oxides since only a short path would be required before the heat would emerge from the 
package for dissipation by some chosen means. Both of these configurations would 
require excessive weight for the subsequent shielding and are therefore unacceptable. 
Minimum shield weight will occur for a fineness ratio of 1.0; this effect is so important 
that such a fineness ratio was baselined. 
The remaining problem of thermal conductivity was first approached by dividing 
the waste into 19 small cylinders which were folded into a hexagonal configuration. A 
hexagon can be formed from only certain numbers of cylinders (=3n2 + 3n + 1) and for 
this study 19 cylinders were chosen. One cylinder was reserved for mechanical reasons, 
and the nominal waste was separated into 18 equal parts. This left a rather short heat 
flow path from the center of the cylinder to the wall of the cylinder. The folded 
cylinders approximated a right circular cylinder of fineness ratio 1 (Fig. 12). 
FURLED UNFURLED 
Figure 12. Hexagonal packaging configuration. 
Heat is now removed from the hexagonal configuration by several means, 
depending upon where the package is in transit. During ground operations and ascent to 
orbit, cooling was to be accomplished by coolant flow through the holes between the 
cylinders. A similar cooling method would occur in case of a catastrophic abort when the 
package is in the ocean. For on-orbit operations and transfer to the ultimate destination, 
the 19 cylinders were to be mechanically unfurled and the heat dissipated to space via 
radiation. 
The prime difficulty with the hexagonal-cylinder concept is that a mechanical 
system must operate to achieve cooling on orbit. Where motion must occur a potential 
failure mechanism exists. To simplify the mechanism, another concept involved packaging 
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the waste into two annular cylinders and one solid cylinder. During periods of active 
cooling (ground operations, ascent, and after a catastrophic abort), coolant flows through 
annular spacings between the cylinders. On orbit the telescoping package is simply pulled 
into a deployed condition for radiant cooling (Fig. 13). 
Figure 13. Telescoping package configuration. 
Although the second mechanism is simpler, it is still a system that must operate. 
For this reason, it is desirable to develop a solid package that meets thermal constraints. 
This was done by assuming that a nominal cubic meter of waste is packaged into a right 
circular cylinder with a fineness ratio of 1 and then, in theory, inserting highly 
conductive fins into the waste. This shortens the distance that heat must flow before 
emerging from the low conductivity oxides. The finning may be added in many ways, but 
two configurations were studied: radial finning and finning orthagonal to the axis of the 
cylinder (Fig. 14). 
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Figure 14. Radial and orthogonal finning concepts. 
Quantative work is required to determine the actual temperature distribution 
within the waste. Although the classic work of Carslaw and Jaeger [ 151 can be used to 
approximate the case in which the fins are orthagonal to the axis, real physical conditions 
require a much more sophisticated treatment. The finning material, for example, is of 
finite conductivity, therefore, trivial boundary conditions are inapplicable (i.e., the 
temperature gradients along the fins are significant). Furthermore, the conductivity of the 
chosen finning material (pyrolytic graphite) is anisotropic as well as temperature dependent. 
Two numerical programs were developed to study the temperature distribution 
within the package. The program used to  study the case in which the finning is 
orthogonal to the axis cylinder [8 ] ,  though approximate, indicates that centerline 
temperatures of approximately 1000°C are readily achievable. 
A second program which utilized radial finning was developed at MSFC for 
quick-look analog analysis. Again it is found that acceptable temperatures are achieved in 
the waste. The temperatures are a strong function of the spacing of the fins and the fin 
thickness. Figure 15 illustrates this point. 
The second major configuration to be studied was that of oxides in a 
hemispherical container. The hemisphere has several advantages over the right circular 
cylinder. Since a cylindrical shape would be expected to have approximately 16 percent 
more surface area than the hemisphere (for a given volume), some saving in shield weight 
would be expected to  accrue. Additionally, the hemisphere lacks leading “corners” that 
could be points of stress concentration during times of impact. Finally, a hemispherical 
configuration can more readily be extracted from outer shielding on orbit. 
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Figure 15. Nuclear waste maximum temperature versus angle between fins at various fin thicknesses. 
The prime disadvantage of the hemisphere is that is presents a difficult packaging 
problem when the waste must be densified at the packing stage. 
It is possible to  fin the package in either of two radial directions. This is most 
readily envisioned by thinking of an orange (the edible fruit). In one case the orange is 
sliced along the equator and the orange slices represent waste cells. In the second case the 
orange is sliced in a plane through the poles - again the orange slices represent waste 
cells. Due to modeling considerations, the second configuration was developed for study. 
This model is quite extensive and accounts for a level of detail which includes contact 
resistances, anisotropic conductivities, surface radiation equilibrium, etc. That is, it is a 
first class model that gives results with a high degree of confidence. The results of this 
model (again demonstrating the validity of finning) is described in Reference 13. 
The modeling thus far demonstrates that there are a number of compensatory 
designs which allow the use of waste oxides. The metal matrix, which represents future 
work that has yet to  be developed has not been discussed. Quick estimates indicate that 
finning is totally unnecessary for the matrix since the conductivity is inherently high in 
that case. If the temperature at  the hottest spot is described as temperatures due to a 
gradient through the waste plus a surface temperature of the waste, then a high waste 
conductivity only lowers the gradient component. The limit for waste centerline 
temperature occurs for infinite waste conductivity because (in space) all heat must be 
radiated through a surface that encloses 1 m3 of waste. 
With a waste mass density of 4.0 gm/cm3, an emissivity of 0.95, and assuming 
that radiation cooling occurs from the curved portion of the hemisphere, the limiting 
temperature is 652°C for Mix 2 and the limit is 610°C for Mix 3. 
From the preceding discussion, for either Mix 2 or Mix 3 the following 
recommendation can be made: 
The innermost waste package shall be a niobium hemisphere containing a nominal 
volume of 1 m3 of waste. If oxides are used, pyrolytic fins are added. In the case of a 
metal matrix, finning is not required. 
B. Radiation Shield 
The waste package must be adequately shielded to protect the ground crew, the 
Orbiter crew and, in the case of the highly improbable event of catastrophic launch 
vehicle failure, people in the area of Earth impact. Calculations were performed to 
determine the gamma shielding requirements for containers of nuclear waste. The 
contribution to the radiation dose due to neutron flux was not taken into account. 
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1. Requirements and Assumptions. Radiation shields designed for use in space 
transportation of nuclear waste must be as light as safety aspects will allow. A computer 
program, SDC [ 161 , obtained from the Radiation Shielding Information Center was used 
to design the gamma shields. Shields were designed for three waste package concepts: 
(1) a hexagonal package with 19 cylinders, (2) a finned cylinder, and (3) a finned hollow 
hemisphere. The design dose rate for the shields is 2 rads/h at a distance of 1 m on all 
sides of the package and 0.1 rad/h at  the Orbiter crew compartment. It was determined 
that 2 rads/h at 1 m is a more stringent requirement than 0.1 rad/h at the crew 
compartment. A conservative assumption was made that the reentry protection system 
P 3 . 8  cm of steel on all sides) would provide no shielding. 
A copy of ORIGEN output, obtained from Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL), was used to estimate the radiation source term for this study. The design basis 
fuel is PWR-U which is irradiated for 3 years to a burnup of 33 000 MWD/MT, 
reprocessed 0.5 year after discharge, and stored for 9.5 years after reprocessing. The 
gamma source strength for Mix 3 (Section 11) is shown in Table 6. 
2. Design Technique. In order to  maximize payloads, the shield weight should be 
minimized. The shields for the hexagonal package with 19 cylinders and the finned 
cylinder were optimized by determining the shield thickness required at each point along 
the waste package and designing the shield to  these specifications. The shields, 
hexagonally shaped for the 19 cylinder configuration and cylindrical for the finned 
cylinder, were found to  have a thickness that may be represented by a quadratic 
equation. This means that shield thickness can be represented as a + bX + cX2 ; where X is 
the distance from the bottom of the waste package to  any point along the package 
length. a, b, and c are constants which are different for each mass of waste, density of 
waste, and shielding material. The top and bottom of the shields were considered to  be 
of constant thickness and equal to  the X = 0 thickness of the shield sides. The hollow 
hemispherical configuration shield thickness was computed by approximating the 
hemisphere as a sphere with the same radius, waste mass, and photon spectrum. The 
hemispherical shield is assumed to have a constant thickness. Figure 16 depicts a typical 
shield for the cylindrical or hexagonal package, and Figure 17 depicts a hemispherical 
shield. Cladding about the shield is to prevent oxidation of the uranium alloy. 
3. Gamma Shield Material, Waste Density, and Neutron Shield Considerations. 
Four materials (iron, lead: tantalum, and uranium) were investigated as possible 
candidates for use as waste package shielding. Uranium, per se, would probably not be 
the shield material (a uranium alloy would probably be used); however, buildup factors 
and attenuation coefficients of uranium were used to  approximate the alloy in this study. 
In addition to the actual shielding, niobium was used as a containment wrap for the 
5. The term “finned” in this context means graphite vanes are inserted into the nuclear 
waste mix. 
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TABLE 6. PHOTON SOURCE STRENGTH (10 years) 
E Mean 
(MeV) 
0.3 
0.63 
1.1 
1.55 
1.99 
2.38 
2.75 
3.25 
Source Strength 
(Photons/s/MT of Heavy Metal 
Charged to the Reactor) 
1.70 x 1014 
3.87 x 1015 
1.32 x 1014 
9.19 X 10 l2  
9.58 X lo lo  
2.57 X 10" 
2.01 x 109 
6.38 x 107 
waste because it has a high melting point, a reasonably low density, and is a rather inert 
metal. Buildup factors and attenuation coefficients for iron were used to represent 
niobium. 
Shields were designed for three mixes with assumed waste densities ranging from 
3 to 6 gm/cm3. Shields were designed for 3000 kg of Mix 3,  density 5 gm/cm3, in the 
19 cylinder hexagonal configuration using each of the four shield materials. Table 7 
presents the results of this exercise. The uranium shield weighed much less than the other 
materials; therefore, it was selected as the primary candidate for use as a shield material. 
Tantalum, due to its structural and thermal properties, was also considered in some 
detail. Figure 18 presents curves of shield weight versus weight of the waste in the 19 
cylinder configuration for uranium and tantalum shield materials and waste densities of 4, 
5 ,  and 6 gm/cm3. As can be seen from this figure, density of the waste is a very 
important factor in shield weight; therefore, it  is imperative that the waste be compacted 
as much as possible. 
Although radiation dose due to neutron flux was not taken into account, the 
study did consider the weight change in the shield when neutron shielding was included. 
The neutron shield was arbitrarily picked as 5 cm or 10 cm of lithium hydride enclosed 
in 0.375 cm thick stainless steel. Figure 19 presents a graph of shield weight versus waste 
weight for Mix 3 with and without neutron shielding. The shield weights for this graph 
were computed for the finned cylinder configuration. Neutron shielding of 5 cm for 4000 
kg of waste increases the total shield weight by approximately 2000 kg. This is not, in 
itself, a show stopper; however, it is a considerable penalty. 
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Figure 17. Typical shield for the hemispherical shield. 
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73 
82 
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Shield Material 
Iron 
Tantalum 
Lead 
Uranium 
7.87 1535 
16.6 2850 
11.34 327 
19.0 1133 
~ 
Shield Requirements 
2000 mrad/h 1 m from shield 
3000 kg, Mix 3, density 5 gm/cm3 Waste 
I Meltyc’oint 
Atomic Number I Density (gm/cm3 ) Shield Weight (kg) 
14 000 
10 330 
9 010 
8 210 
4. Hollow Hemispherical Configuration Shielding. The hollow hemispherical 
configuration is, at this time, the preferred configuration; therefore, the traffic analysis 
(Section VIII) is computed assuming uranium shield weights for the hemispherical 
configuration with a waste density of 4 gm/cm3. Figures 20 and 2 1 present information 
about the shields for this configuration. Shield weight versus waste weight (waste density 
= 3, 4, and 5 gm/cm3) is presented in Figure 20 for Mix 3. This figure emphasizes that 
shield weight is a function of density of the waste. Figure 21 shows shield weight 
(density = 4 gm/cm3) for Mixes 3, 5, and 5A. The shield design presented herein should 
be considered prelimiAary, thus there remains a tremendous amount of work in this area 
that must be performed in future studies. Some of the areas requiring additional work 
are: (1) shield material, (2) neutron shielding (is it necessary, and, if so, what material), 
(3) effects of secondary gammas, and (4) design dose rate. 
C. Mechanical Containment 
The third important component of the nuclear waste package is the mechanical 
containment; this is the primary safeguard against release of the waste material. 
The first two components of the package, the canister and the gamma shield, fit 
inside the mechanical containment shell. Although the canister will be removed on orbit 
(and must therefore not be rigidly attached to the gamma shield), there appears to be 
advantages to a direct attachment between the gamma shield and mechanical containment 
shell. 
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Figure 18. Shield weight for 19 cylinder configuration. 
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Figure 19. Neutron shielding effects. 
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Figure 20. Shield weight as a function of waste density. 
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The shielding effect of the containment shell was ignored in the design of the 
gamma shield. A conservative design was developed. Conversely, the mechanical strength 
of the gamma shield was ignored when the containment shell was developed, which is 
also a very conservative assumption. The total integration of an overall systems design 
will undoubtedly decrease the weight of each system. 
The design of the containment subsystem, to date, is covered primarily in 
Reference 17. The salient features of that study are described here and the reader is 
referred to  the source material for calculations which justify the listed choices [ 171. 
The design of the containment, together with the reentry protection shield, is 
driven by the accident/abort potential of the delivery system; Le., the nuclear waste must 
be protected, which is a severe requirement. Without attempting to  list all possible 
accidents, one need only consider a failure on the launch pad [Hz/Oz explosion near the 
Solid Rocket Motors (SRM)] or a Shuttle failure which occurs near orbit to  envision 
potential accident environments. 
The containment shell was studied with respect to various abort times along the 
ascent trajectory such as Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) staging, External Tank (ET) 
separation, and near orbital conditions; and it was determined that the most severe 
(reentry) environment for the shell occurred if abort occurred just prior to  orbit. A 
failure at this time resulted in an ultimate impact velocity of almost 250 m/s. The loads 
on the system during descent totaled approximately 4.45 X lo6 N. These loads were 
considerably lower than those experienced at water impact, however. The highest loading 
- an impact on granite - is discussed later. The loadings that dictated the design were 
sized by water impact considerations. 
An immediate tradeoff that must be confronted is that the aerodynamics of the 
reentry capsule, to achieve minimal impact velocity, requires a large blunt nose. This is 
exactly converse to  the design that would minimize water impact loads, i.e., a slender 
needle-like configuration. The dilemma was resolved by requiring a rather slim nose for 
water impact loads (0.91 m) and attaching a large flare behind the waste package to act 
as an aerobraking device. (The flare was used in additional roles in that it becomes a 
parachute stowage area and a flotation cell for ultimate recovery. The parachutes were 
assumed to have failed, however, when the loads were sized.) 
For an 0.91 m diameter nose and an impact velocity of 250 m/s, the impact 
pressure on the dome was calculated to  be approximately 38 X lo6 N/m2, and this 
occurs at approximately 0.05 ms after impact. By 4 ms after impact, the force has 
dropped close to zero in comparison with the initial force. (The loads on the flare are 
obviously much smaller.) The deceleration load on the capsule peaks at approximately 1 
ms and attains a value of 450 g. 
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(The time scales involved and the magnitude of the calculated forces indicate that 
we are operating outside the range of most engineering data. Indeed, various theories 
describe differing results and an experimental program would be needed to  obtain hard 
data.) 
The results of the previous analysis must be translated into actual thickness of 
materials before they are to  be used in sizing the waste container. A shell of constant 
thickness is very wasteful, and it was found that a “tapered” containment shell 
successfully met the requirements. The thickest portion of the shell (at the dome) was 
calculated to be 19 cm (using a safety factor of 1.5). The shell decreases in thickness 
until the flare occurs, and the flare thickness can be expected to  be on the order of 0.34 
to  1.28 cm. 
The impact of the total capsule in water can be estimated as an e5gineering 
problem. In Reference 17, it is shown that this solution is compatible with the 
constraints of Shuttle lifting capacity, payload positioning requirements, etc. 
Furthermore, the first nominal backup system for the unlikely event of a Shuttle 
failure is intact abort capability and a return to  a landing strip. If the Shuttle failure is 
catastrophic, which is more unlikely, then the payload package is ejected. (A description 
of the ejection system is included in this section.) The system design involves the use of 
braking parachutes which will slow the package to  approximately 30 m/s at impact. 
Nonetheless, the containment shell is sized for an impact velocity of 250 m/s in water; 
i.e., a total parachute failure is assumed. 
Land impact is a possibility from any terrestrial launch site. If it is assumed that 
the compounding of improbabilities presents a catastrophic Shuttle failure followed by a 
totally inoperative parachute system, then the probability of land impact is still 
exceedingly small for the assumed launch sites. Indeed, the abort window, which results 
in land impact, is only a few tenths of a second. 
Impact on soil which has the characteristics of soft sand is not much more severe 
an environment than is impact on water (water impact at 250 m/s is approximately 
equivalent to  such an impact at 140 m/s). Our assumed safety factor would then very 
probably retain containment. 
The ultimate test involves impact onto a granite massif, and this scenario would 
probably result in cracking (though not fragmenting) the containment shell. An 
immediate backup system (the gamma shield) has not been included in the potential 
ultimate rupture calculations. This is an area of the study for which no answer exists at 
the present time. It will be investigated as the study progresses. 
Perhaps the more serious threat which occurs from land impact is not breaching 
of the package, per se, but rather an eventual meltdown of the package. The cooling 
effect of sea water will guarantee a cool package if recovery occurs in water, but the 
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temperature will certainly rise if land impact occurs. Two circumstances mitigate the heat 
problem, however. One of these is that at the time of abort the package is rather cool 
and it has a very large thermal inertia. (Preliminary calculations indicated that even 
several days after injection into a transfer orbit the package had not attained an 
equilibrium temperature.) Furthermore, the surroundings and/or weather patterns (e.g., 
rain) could slow the time to  reach equilibrium. Another inherent advantage of space 
disposal is that failure is detected in real time and a trained recovery team would 
probably be dispatched in an airborne scramble before the package even impacts the 
Earth. The recovery aids (pingers) would make location a simple matter. 
The package would be an object of curiosity to  most humans and possibly even 
animals, but its temperature would preclude close approach. If it was deemed necessary, 
various repelling attachments could also decorate the package. 
D. Thermal Protection System 
As in the case of the mechanical containment system, the thermal protection 
system was designed by NSi. The total results of their study are given in Reference 17 
and only a brief summary is given here. 
The reentry heating thermal protection system and internal heating of the waste 
are treated together. This discussion is rather unique in that few reentry problems have to 
worry about both external and internal heating. The calculations indicate that if the 
conditions at initiation of a catastrophic abort correspond to equilibrium conditions in 
the Shuttle then the nuclear waste temperature will not rise significantly during reentry. 
That is, the problem eventually decouples. 
Several candidate materials for reentry protection are investigated: ATJ graphite 
backed with Min-K insulation, noncharring carbon phenolic, charring silicone elastomer, 
and noncharring phenolic nylon. The optimal system, to  date, is baselined as ATJ 
graphite-Min-K insulation over the hemispherical waste package with carbon-phenolic used 
in the flare and base regions. 
ATJ graphite is a brittle material, which is one reason it was chosen. The purpose 
in wanting a brittle material is that if the package impacts the ocean (as is desired), the 
water is expected to  cool the nuclear waste until such time as rescue arrives. Reentry 
materials, by their very nature, do not allow a transferral of heat to any significant 
degree and, thus, the necessary heat protection shield becomes a detriment once impact 
occurs. One way out of the dilemma is t o  guarantee that the shield fragments upon 
impact. This raises the possibility that mechanical flexure during reentry, vibration loadings, 
etc., could strip away the shield before impact. 
ATJ graphite represents an attempt to  produce a safe reentry thermal protection 
system which breaks away on impact. it may not represent a practical solution, however. 
The difference in loading between reentry and impact is so great that an acceptable 
material must exist. Future work will include further investigation of this point. 
61 
An aspect of the thermal design which has yet to be addressed is the on-pad 
explosion. The most severe environment in this case has yet to be determined, but the 
following is offered as a potential limiting case. Suppose that a Shuttle explosion occurs 
in such a way that the two solid rocket motors land .on each side of the waste package 
and burn for the maximum possible length of time. This is obviously an extremely 
unlikely event either geometrically or physically (i.e., nonpropulsive burning of the SRM). 
The possibility of such an event occurring must be investigated and, if found to  be 
possible, the thermal protection system must withstand such an assault. No comparison 
between the required thermal protection system for this case and the reentry case has 
been made to  date. 
E. Ejection System 
The ejection system for the nuclear waste payload will be used only in case of a 
catastrophic Shuttle failure. In the event of this type failure, the payload bay doors will 
be blown off and the payload and associated supporting structure will be ejected. It was 
assumed that the weight to be ejected will be 29 000 kg. 
The ejection system consists of six TE-M-424 SRM's. These motors are existing 
equipment that were developed as S-1C retro rockets. The hazard class of both motors 
and igniters are ICC class B and military class 2. The six motors have a total weight of 
1373 kg and develop a thrust of 2.292 X 106N for 0.63 s. 
The ejection system accelerates the payload at 79 m/s2 which is sufficient to clear 
the rear of the payload bay and the Shuttle vertical tail. Ambient pressure of 1.013 X 
lo5 N/m2 (1 atm) was assumed for calculation of system performance data. Figure 22 
depicts the proximity of the payload and the rear wall of the payload bay during ejection 
for constant Shuttle linear accelerations of 29.4 m/s2 (3 g) and 44.1 m/s2 (4.5 g). The 
relative position of the Shuttle to the payload (both Shuttle and payload under no 
acceleration) for 6 s after payload bay clearance is shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Orbiter/payload separation. 
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V. MISSION SCENARIO 
The mission secnario discussed in this section will deal with events from launch to 
disposal. The section of the waste package history preceding delivery to the launch pad is 
not covered here. 
The space disposal of nuclear waste involves the launch of two Shuttles, and the 
scenario does not depend upon whether Mix 2 or Mix 3 is carried. The scenario is, 
however, destination dependent; therefore, two scenarios will be described for those areas 
where differences occur. 
The launch of Shuttle No. 1 is (in all ways) a standard space launch for any 
Shuttle vehicle which carries an OTV. The loading, countdown, launch, and ascent would 
be expected to proceed in the same manner as would a purely scientific mission. The 
only modification that might be expected is that launch times would be chosen to match 
the window for the chosen destination; however, this type of constraint occurs in 
virtually all launches. The orbital destination for Shuttle No. 1 would be a rendezvous 
compatible orbit with respect to the launch of the subsequent Shuttle. 
Once on orbit Shuttle No. 1 unloads the OTV and performs a complete systems 
checkout of that vehicle. If, at this time, any malfunctions on the OTV'are identified the 
first corrective action would be to repair the malfunction on orbit if possible. Barring the 
possibility of such a repair, the OTV would probably be nonpropulsively vented and 
returned to Earth base for renovation. 
If the systems checkout reveals a nominal situation on orbit, the preparation for 
launching Shuttle No. 2 will proceed. Fueling of the second vehicle would occur and 
checkout completed while the nuclear waste payload remains in site storage. Once the 
preparation of the vehicle is complete, the payload is removed from on-site storage and 
coolant lines are switched from ground-based to a coolant cart supply. The coolant cart 
then moves the payload t o  the launch pad where the payload is transferred to the 
payload changeout room and then to the Shuttle. There is a brief interruption of coolant 
flow during this period, but the thermal inertia of the package allows more than adequate 
time for changeover. 
Once aboard Shuttle No. 2, the package is again connected with an active cooling 
system on the vehicle. Final checkouts involve only the package/Shuttle interface, and if 
any difficulties are encountered they can either be repaired or the mission cancelled as 
fits the case. 
Shuttle No. 2, at the launch window, ascends to a near rendezvous with the first 
Shuttle and the demated OTV. The second Shuttle assumed a station near the pair of 
orbiting vehicles. The cargo bay doors are opened and the waste package is removed from 
the manned craft via remote manipulator arms. At the time of removal, the active 
coolant loop is again broken. 
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The package is retained by the manipulator arms until final checkout and then is 
released. The package is stabilized via an integral RCS. 
Shuttle No. 2 now withdraws to  a convenient distance and the waiting O W  
approaches the stabilized package. The OTV docks and the cocoon remains stationary 
while the transfer vehicle backs away from it. At this time, much of the protective cover 
is removed from the waste package. The reentry thermal protection system, mec$anical 
containment, and gamma ray shield (the “cocoon”) are removed as a unit from the waste 
package. In the case of an unsuccessful dock that cannot be repaired, the waste package 
would simply be resealed and returned to  Shuttle No. 2 for coolant reconnection. The 
subsequent history then becomes a function of the gravity of the problem and which 
piece of equipment is causing trouble. In the worst case, the package could be returned 
to Earth for repair and relaunch. 
The mated OTV waste package can now be assumed to  be prepared for final 
departure. Thus far, the scenario has been independent of destimtion but further 
description requires a branching of the options. 
The case of a transfer to  the lunar surface is presented first (Fig. 6) .  The initial 
OTV burn is relatively long and adds an increment of 2952.2 m/s. The vehicle coasts 
away from the Earth under monitoring and careful tracking in this intermediate orbit. At 
apogee, where the speed is a minimum, a second burn occurs, which serves two purposes: 
it rotates the orbital plane to  match that of the Moon and, at the same time, raises 
perigee. The second burn adds a velocity increment of only 4 m/s. 
By the time perigee is reached, careful tracking has established all orbital 
parameters. A perigee burn then establishes a lunar “impact commit.” This burn is of the 
244.4 m/s magnitude. The state-of-the-art of guidance and navigation is such that a lunar 
impact can be guaranteed at nominal thrust termination. 
The fourth burn (2.9 m/s) is a targeting burn that specifies an exact landing 
point. In case the third burn is near perfect, this burn may be cancelled entirely. 
The final bum (2850.1 m/s) is a retro braking burn near the lunar surface. It is 
calculated to deliver the package to  the lunar surface at zero relative velocity. 
In the case of disposal in solar orbit, the mission scenario differs from that just 
described. Due to the nature of the solar orbit mission and the smaller AV requirement, 
the OTV can be utilized in a reusable mode, but an additional solid propellant stage is 
added to  the system. The solid stage is launched to orbit together with the OTV. 
One long burn (3260 m/s) of the OTV occurs, and the OTV separates from the 
waste package and solid stage for return to LEO. The waste package moves toward the 
Sun on an elliptical transfer, achieving a perisol of 0.86 AU 6 months later. At this time 
the small solid stage is ignited to produce a velocity increment of 1190 m/s, and a 
circular orbit is achieved. 
In either of the two previously described scenarios, the cocoon remains in orbit 
on station with the two Shuttles. Following launch of the OTV, Shuttle No. 2 retrieves 
the cocoon and stows it in the cargo bay for return to  Earth and subsequent reuse. For 
the lunar mission, Shuttle No. 1 would return empty or be used to pick up a payload 
that is unrelated to the waste disposal program. 
In the case of a solar orbit destination, the first Shuttle would return with an 
empty OTV. This could be the OTV which was just used on the mission or could be an 
OTV from a prior mission. 
The reason for retrieving the OTV in the case of a solar orbit mission and not 
retrieving in the case of a lunar mission is simply a question of economics. The lower 
required fuel expenditure for the solar mission allows for an economic OTV recovery, 
whereas the lunar mission does not. 
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VI. G R O U N D  OPERATIONS 
A. Transportation from Reprocessor to Receiving Facility 
at Launch Site 
The options for transportation are dependent upon the location of the 
reprocessing facility and the launch site. A combination of transportation modes is 
conceivable; however, it  might involve added interfaces in handling the container. 
The options for transportation between the reprocessing facility and the launch 
site are (1) highway truck, (2) rail car, (3) barge or ship, or (4) a combination of these. 
The characteristics of the high level waste (HLW) and the cooling requirements 
are such that the shipping cask and container weight probably will exceed the allowable 
highway weights by a factor of 1.5 to 2. It is possible, given access to a navigable 
waterway, that special trailers could be used to transport overweight casks onto a barge 
without traveling on public highways. In a similar manner, special rail cars could also be 
transported by barge for part of the trip. 
The use of special rail cars appears to offer the greatest flexibility for (1) 
reprocessing facility location, (2) launch site location, (3)  alternate routes, (4) all weather 
movements, and (5) anticipated weights. 
Overseas transportation would involve shipment of the cask to the seaport by rail, 
truck, or barge; disconnection of the cooling system; hoisting into the ship hold; and 
reconnection of the cooling system. The same general procedure would be followed at 
the receiving port. Shipment to the seaport by barge could include additional transfers 
such as from the barge to the dock and from the dock to the ship. 
1. Receipt of the Cask at Receiving __ Facility. The cask will be delivered to the 
receiving facility and offloaded by overhead crane from the transporter. The cask is 
opened and the cocoon-shield package (CSP) is inspected and removed. It may be 
necessary at this point to attach a temporary neutron shield to the CSP which will 
remain until loaded aboard the Shuttle. During this process, the cooling system is 
disconnected and the CSP is connected to the facility cooling unit. The cask and its 
cooling unit are returned to  the reprocessor. 
_-__ 
The receiving facility should be in a building which would minimize spread of 
contamination in the event of faulted conditions. However, it need not incorporate 
remote handling facilities. There should be equipment to  cope with various package 
problems, leaks, cooling system failures, etc. The handling area should be designed to 
facilitate decontamination, should such activities be required. Systems should be available 
to complete the assembly of the cocoon by attaching the nose and tail assemblies and to 
perform all inspections and system tests. 
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B. Launch Site Selection 
The factors presented here must be considered in the selection of a launch site for 
nuclear waste disposal mission. 
1. Ground Track of the Ascent to Orbit Trajectory. The ground track of the 
ascent-to-orbit trajectory is of primary importance. Ideally, one would like a ground track 
that was completely over water such that the nuclear waste package would land in the 
ocean for uncontrolled aborts. The impact loads would be less and, with the aid of 
flotation devices, recovery from the ocean would not present any insurmountable 
problems. Also, having an aborted payload dropped in the ocean would not create the 
international incident that would occur if the waste package landed on foreign soil. 
Figure 24 shows a ground track for a Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch. To keep the 
ground track off of South Africa, yaw steering was utilized after SRB separation. The 
dwell time (the A t  during which a failure must occur to result in land impact) over the 
Greater Sunda Islands and the northwestern tip of New Guinea is less than 0.4 s. Thus, 
the probability of an uncontrolled abort occurring that would result in ground impact is 
very small. 
As long as the nuclear waste disposal launch rates are low, it is expected that 
existing launch facilities at KSC could be used. As the launch rate increases, additional 
launch pads and associated facilities will be required. The construction of a remote 
launch site offers the advantage of removing the launch area away from highly populated 
areas so that risks of possible launch pad or near launch pad accidents to man would be 
minimized. The proper selection of the remote launch site would provide for minimum 
overflight of land during ascent to orbit. 
Figure 25 shows a ground track for a launch from the island, Trindade, which was 
chosen as an example of a remote site. No major significance should be attached to this 
preliminary choice, it merely represents a possible launch site that presents a difficult 
problem in fitting together the necessary components. (Trindade is uncomfortably small.) 
A launch azimuth of 121" was assumed to minimize ground overflight. The dwell time 
over Indonesia and the Philippines is less than 0.5 s. Table 8 presents a comparison of 
launching from KSC versus Trindade. 
Due to the variation in terrain on Trindade, it would be very expensive to 
construct a runway of sufficient length to land the Shuttle Orbiter. Figure 26 shows a 
layout of a remote operational base for Trindade. The Orbiter would be flown to  an 
airfield on the South American continent and transported by ship to Trindade. For a 
nominal mission launched from Trindade, the Shuttle Orbiter would land at either KSC 
and be flown to  the South American landing site via a 747 or land directly from orbit. 
For missions where the nuclear waste has to be returned from orbit due a subsystem 
failure, landing would be at a remote landing site. Figure 27 shows the deorbit 
opportunities for a Trindadelaunch. Figure 28 shows the same data for a KSC launch. 
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Figure 25. Orbiter/ET impact trace for Trindade launch. 
2. Cost, Availability, and Accessibility of a Remote Launch Site. In preparing the 
cost estimates from a remote site, a factor of two is used to account for the increased 
costs. All labor and equipment would have to be transported to and from the site. To 
construct the site, harbors and docks would be required. In summary, the construction of 
a new remote launch site would be a very large cost undertaking. 
The availability of the selected new launch site would have to be considered early 
in the program, and would depend on the diplomatic relations with the country 
concerned. With the vast amount of money involved, national commitments for a long 
period of time would be required. The other country involved would stand to  gain in 
many economic ways from the construction and operation of the new launch site. 
The new launch sites under consideration, which would give the minimum 
overland flight time, are either natural islands or possibly a manmade base. Accessibility 
to either of these will be difficult. All equipment and supplies will require transfer by 
boat which will make the entire operation sensitive to  weather. Operational problems and 
launch delays would be frequent and unavoidable. 
TABLE 8. ETR AND TRINDADE LAUNCH SITE CONSIDERATIONS 
Can share some existing launch facilities 
Potential nuclear contamination of 
general launch facilities 
Dedicated, secure launch facilities 
No land impact for a controllable 
orbiter 
Extremely small dwell time over land 
1 ET impact in an approved area 
, International launch site 
1 U.S. waste must be shipped by boat - .  - . .  
Advantage 
Disadvantage 
Disadvantage 
Advantage 
Advantage 
Advantage 
Disadvantage 
Trindade 
~ ~ 
Disadvantage 
Advantage 
Advantage 
Advantage 
? 
Advantage 
Disadvantage 
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Figure 26. Remote operational base concept Trindade Island (Brazil). 
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Figure 27. Deorbit opportunities for Trindade launch. 
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Figure 28. Deorbit opportunities for KSC launch. 
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3. Acceptance by the Local Population of the Nuclear Accident Risk. This area 
can be considered from two aspects. The first is if the nuclear payloads are launched 
from KSC and the second is from a remote launch site. The general attitude of the U.S. 
population has not been positive in this type of activity. For instance, the estabhhment 
of terrestrial storage facilities has encountered negative response from the local 
populations. The increased economic benefits from a high launch rate would mitigate the 
risk of an accident and could help in local populace acceptance. 
If the remote site were a manmade island or base, no local population would be 
involved and therefore it would not be a problem. If the site were an inhabitated island, 
similar problems to KSC would be involved. Possible solutions would include economic 
considerations either as employment at the site or total displacement for economic 
consideration or both. 
4. Potential Hazard to the Local Population and Surrounding Area in the Event 
of a Launch Facility or Launch ~ Vehicle Accident. Although the nuclear waste packaging 
will be designed to withstand the worst credible accident scenario, ground rules will 
require an assumption of spillage even though it is not likely to  happen. The results of 
such an accident might cascade throughout the environment in both the short and long 
term and will be considered further in future reports. For further information on possible 
causes and results of such an accident, see Reference 8. 
5 .  Nuclear Waste Mix Selected for Launch. This factor needs to be considered in 
the launch site selection because it directly influences the launch rate. High launch rates 
at a remote site would greatly increase the logistics problems. However, the high launch 
rates would make the remote site more attractive because of the sonic booms from the 
returning Orbiter. 
C. Required Equipment and Facilities 
The equipment and facilities required for launching the nuclear payload will 
depend on whether the payloads are launched from KSC or if a new site is developed. 
If the launches are from KSC, some parts of the existing STS could be used with 
some new equipment added. As the program grows, additional dedicated facilities would 
be required. 
The initial ground facilities would include a nuclear facility for processing and 
checkout of the payload. To provide complete assurance of mission success, a total 
payload including cocoon and OTV systems mating and operations test should be 
performed. The facility would provide all necessary ground support equipment (GSE) for 
receiving, unloading, storage, and checkout of the payload. In addition, it would provide 
a place for storage and reprocessing in case of a payload accident. 
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To transport the payload to the launch pad, a new dedicated transporter would 
be required. This transporter would include cooling GSE and would be compatible with 
the PCR. Other GSE would include handling, cooling, and servicing equipment for the 
payload and OTV. 
The OTV could be processed at KSC initially in existing facilities; however, as the 
launch rate increased, it would be necessary to  add dedicated facilities. 
The building of a new launch facility for a Shuttle type orbiter on a remote 
island would be a large and expensive undertaking. An estimate of the cost is 
approximately two billion dollars. The cost is also dependent on the weather at the 
remote site. If bad weather can be expected, the launch vehicle would have to be 
assembled inside, as at KSC, and a mobile launch platform used for transfer to the pad. 
A brief listing of remote facilities and equipment is as follows: 
( 1 ) Nuclear facility 
(2) Launch pad and crawlers 
( 3 )  Vertical assembly building 
(4) Orbiter landing strip 
(5) SRB facility 
(6) Manufacture facilities, storage, and transfer of propellant, fluids, and gases. 
(7) Orbiter processing facility 
(8) Launch control center 
(9) Personnel facilities 
(1 0) Harbors, docks, cranes, and transporters. 
D. Comparison of Ground Operations for Space Disposal 
Versus Terrestrial Storage 
For terrestrial storage a very simplified flow would include the following steps: 
(1) Load selected waste into a container which is compatible with the handling 
system 
(2) Seal container 
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(3) Perform heat load and hot spot tests 
(4) Load into shipping cask, attach cooling equipment, and transport to  storage 
site 
(5) Receive, disconnect cooling equipment, and inspect at storage site 
(6) Transport to storage entrance 
(7) Mate with remote handling equipment 
(8) Transfer to selected site in storage facility 
(9) Return transfer equipment to  storage entrance. 
A number of assumptions are made for this flow; e.g., the site is within the U.S., and 
that no cooling is required at final storage site. 
For space disposal of nuclear wastes it is necessary to define operational flows for 
three elements. These elements are the nuclear payload, the cocoon, and the OTV. Flows 
for the payload and the cocoon are shown on Figures 29 and 30. The flow for the OTV 
is standard and is not presented. 
The flows would include the following steps: 
A. Nuclear Payload 
1. Load selected waste into a container which is compatible with the flight 
system. 
2. Seal container. 
3. Perform heat load and hot spot tests. 
4. Load into shipping cask, attach cooling equipment, and transport to  launch 
site. 
5. Receive and inspect. 
6. Mate to  cocoon, perform checkout. 
7. Transport to  PCR. 
8. Load into Shuttle and launch. 
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Launch and Flight Operations. 
To summarize, the ground operations for space disposal and terrestrial storage are 
dissimiliar. For the current baseline space disposal, the nuclear waste will utilize Mix 2 or 
Mix 3 to reduce the amount to be flown. This will result in a reduced number of ground 
transport trips for space as compared to terrestrial disposal. The flight vehicles will need 
active cooling and, later in the flight, passive cooling. The need for active cooling will 
influence all of the ground operations. The flight payload will require a completely 
different design for handling, lifting, and transportation. And finally, weight will be a 
prime consideration in the flight option. 
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VII. SAFETY AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Space disposal of nuclear waste can be achieved for any of the space options 
discussed in Section 111. All of the options considered are, from a technical standpoint, 
less complicated than the highly successful Apollo and Viking missions. The main issue is 
one of overall mission safety. At most, a mission failure in either the Apollo or Viking 
programs resulted in the loss of several hundred million dollars, and in the Apollo 
program, a three man crew. However, in the space disposal of nuclear waste, a mission 
failure could endanger the lives of thousands of people. Thus, overall mission safety is a 
prime program driver. 
The probability of mission success is an important figure of merit for missions 
such as Viking and Apollo because it represents the probability of achieving the planned 
scientific goals. In the space disposal of nuclear waste, one would like the probability of 
mission success to be as high as possible; however, a more important figure of merit is 
the probability of not contaminating the environment (releasing radioactive waste) in 
disposing of nuclear waste in space. It is important to note that the probability of not 
contaminating the environment is not 1 minus (the probability of mission success). There 
are many subsystem failures that could preclude mission success, but would not result in 
the release of nuclear waste. This is especially true for a manned, winged vehicle like the 
Space Shuttle. Also for a catastrophic Shuttle abort, the reentry protection system will 
allow safe return of the waste package to the Earth. For OTV failures that leave the 
waste package in an unacceptable orbit, rescue can be achieved with a backup vehicle. 
A Failure and Contingency Analysis (FACA) was performed to postulate the most 
probable failures and to  develop contingency workarounds. These workarounds or 
alternatives are developed to allow completion of the mission safely, with minimum 
hazard to crew personnel and the Earth or lunar environment. To accomplish this, a 
mission event sequence was developed for each of the proposed missions. This sequence 
of events considers the various facilities and systems/subsystems involved in the various 
mission phases, and represents the flow of each toward mission accomplishment. An 
overview of the mission event sequence for a HE0 mission is shown in Figure 31. 
Associated with these events are detailed task steps indicated in the lettered and 
numbered boxes of the mission sequence of events. These task steps have been developed 
for each mission option under consideration, and an example is shown in Figure 32. A 
complete list of the task steps can be found in Reference 17. The task flows were used as 
a basis for postulating a number of failures and alternative contingencies to  identify 
recovery and safety requirements and to highlight safety concerns for each mission phase. 
The basic assumption in an FACA study is that if a complex system can fail, it  
will fail, given sufficient time or opportunity. These failures can occur at random during 
a mission; thus, the analysis essentially compresses the spectrum of mission time and 
assumes that the failures do occur. For each failure or mission sequence interruption, one 
or more contingency actions or alternatives are suggested. 
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The outcome of the FACA exercise is a set of general guidelines and assumptions 
which have been developed for all phases of the mission and are presented in the next 
three subsections. 
A. Ground Handling Safety Guidelines 
A number of potential accident situations exist during the various stages of 
handling from the initial stage of loading at the reprocessing facility through the loading 
into the Shuttle a t  the launch site. The period of highest risk (to the public and 
environment) appears to  be during transportation and during the loading aboard the 
Shuttle. During the other handling periods, the waste is within facilities that should limit 
the spread of waste in the event of most conceivable accidents. 
In the normal handling and transportation of a radioactive materials package, a 
variety of potential accidents are considered. Nuclear Regulatory Comission/Department 
of Transportation (NRC/DOT) regulations generally define the level of protection 
required to  meet these accident situations. Ground handling of nuclear waste for a space 
disposal mission does not present any unique problems when compared to  ground 
handling for terrestrial disposal; however, the packaging configuration for space disposal 
involves new concepts. A list of ten potential accidents is presented in Table 9. (This is 
certainly not meant to  be a complete list.) Each of these types. of accidents is rated on 
the basis of the consequences of it occurring at each location. In many instances the 
particular accident situation does not exist and is noted as not applicable (NA). In other 
instances the requirements of the NRC/DOT regulations are such that the consequences 
would be negligible. The following is a set of Safety Guidelines for the ground handling 
phase of the space disposal mission (other guidelines will be stated as the study evolves): 
(1 )  The nuclear waste will remain within its radiation shield during all NASA 
ground and launch operations. 
(2) Provide a nuclear handling facility at the NASA launch site. 
(3) Provide dosimeters badges for nuclear handling ground crews. 
(4) Provide training and procedures in the use of radiation monitoring 
equipment . 
(5) Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable of 
supporting the payload at the nuclear handling facility, the transporter, and the launch 
pad. 
(6) Rotate nuclear handling assignments for the ground crew to minimize the 
radiation dose for each person. Current standards limit the annual dose that personnel 
can receive. 
83 
00 
P TABLE 9. POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING TERRESTRIAL HANDLING OF 
NUCLEAR WASTE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Type of Accident 
Spill canister 
Burn through weld 
while putting cover on 
Drop canister 
Puncture canister 
(no other containment) 
Drop canister and 
shield 
Drop canister, shield 
and cocoon 
Loss of coolant 
Fire 
Submersion 
Puncture shipping cask 
Processing Facility 
In hot cell bothersome, but 
can be isolated 
Repairable 
In hot cell can be isolated 
In hot cell can be isolated 
Can be outside of hot cell. 
May crack and spill 
Meets NRC/DOT regulations. 
No problem 
4 h to hook up new system 
In hot cell? Outside H.C.-cas& 
meets NRC/DOT regulations, 
should survive 
NA 
NA 
Consequences of Accident at 
Transportation 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Meets NRC/DOT regulations. 
No problem 
4 h to hook up new system 
Outside H.C.-cask meets 
NRC/DOT regulations, should 
survive 
Meets NRC/DOT regulations. 
No problem 
Should meet NRC require- 
ments 
Receiving Facility 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Meets NRC/DOT regulations. 
No problem 
4 h to  hook up new system 
Outside H.C.-cask meets 
NRC/DOT regulations, shoulc 
survive 
NA 
Should meet NRC require- 
ments 
Launch Site 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Probably scratch 
Mission 
Could scratch mission 
or go on hold 
Catastrophic to 
Shuttle and launch 
NA 
NA 
Note: Accidents and consequences involving the actual launch and space operation are discussed in Section IV. 
(7) Train and have on 24 h a day standby an emergency crew for safing of the 
nuclear waste package. 
(8) Assure that backup power is available for nuclear payload safing in the 
event of commercial power failure. 
(9) Provide procedures and facilities for decontamination in the event of 
radioactive containment rupture or meltdown. 
(1 0) Provide triple redundancy for the payload temperature monitoring circuits 
with a “kill” switch for each circuit, thereby averting a full safing alert in the event of 
failure of any one circuit element. 
(11) Provide for an alternate storage cooling operation, i.e., the nuclear waste 
inside its radiation shielding to remain in the facility cooling pond prior to  launch day 
and mating with the cocoon. 
(12) Provide a “dummy” payload to  be used t o  check out the physical fit and 
function of the payload with the Shuttle prior to launch day and as a training vehicle for 
OTV to payload attaching and release exercised. 
(13) Maintain administratively controlled areas with a minimum radius of 
approximately 13 km and exclusion areas of 4 km radius from launch site. 
(14) Install the payload at the last practical point in the Shuttle launch 
countdown sequence. 
(15) Provide capability to  defuel the Shuttle in nuclear emergencies on the 
launch pad. 
(16) Provide for a cooling pond, pool, or large body of water adjacent to  the 
launch pad. 
(1 7) Provide and maintain a comprehensive training program for all personnel 
involved with the payload from receipt of the launch site through arrival at destination 
including emergencies and workarounds. 
B. Flight Operations Safety Guideline 
In the area of flight operations, there are procedures and precautions that are 
utilized routinely on all space missions to  increase the overall mission safety. In addition 
to these, additional procedures and precautions have been identified which should be 
implemented for nuclear waste disposal missions: 
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(1 ) Prohibit launch during unsatisfactory weather conditions, particularly with 
winds blowing toward populated areas. 
(2) Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas. 
(3) Consider Shuttle touchdown area remote from inhabited facilities. 
(4) Provide dosimeter badges for Shuttle astronauts. 
( 5 )  Provide means of warning of imminent collision with orbiting vehicles. 
(6) Provide training and procedures in the use of radiation monitoring 
equipment. 
(7) Rotate nuclear handling assignments for the astronauts to minimize the 
radiation dose for each person. 
(8) In case of abort, consider dumping of excess Shuttle propellant prior to 
landing to minimize explosive potential. 
(9) Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle or 
transfer or retrieval of the payload in orbit for the continuance of the mission. 
(10) Develop a credible heat/time chart after loss of coolant (TBD). Provide this 
to the payload specialist and mission control so that a judgment can be made to continue 
or abort the mission depending upon the time of failure within the overall mission time. 
(1 1) Train the astronauts in RMS malfunction analysis and repair. 
(12) Train the astronauts in payload stabilization while operating in the 
extravehicular activity (EVA) mode and utilizing his personnel attitude propulsion system 
(APS). 
(13) Train the astronauts in malfunction analysis and disassembly of the payload 
access door mechanism into the nuclear waste package. 
(14) Train the astronauts in the proper approach and retreat of the “hot” 
nuclear waste material utilizing shadow shielding provided by the cocoon and shield. 
(15) Bias the trajectory (where applicable) so that the probability of Earth 
impact will be lessened in the event of failure of the OTV to make the final burn(s). 
Again, this listing will be extended and/or modified as experience dictates. 
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C. Special ProceduredRequirements 
Certain Shuttle modifications and additions will be required to make the Shuttle 
more compatible with the nuclear waste disposal mission: 
(1) Provide redundant circuits to monitor radiation and heat from the nuclear 
waste package. 
(2) Assure that each redundant circuit is capable of checkout during prelaunch. 
(3) Provide a remotely controlled, manually activated means of ejecting the 
payload during a catastrophic event a t  the launch pad. 
(4) Provide backup automatic ejection of the payload in the event of a 
catastrophic event which might render a manual ejection system inoperative. 
( 5 )  Provide for detection by the flight crew of any redundant element that fails 
after mating of the payload to the Shuttle, and during the boost and LEO insertion 
phases. 
(6) Consider a completely redundant onboard cooling system that can be 
switched over to  the payload in the event of failure of the first system. 
( 7 )  Design for a positive and forceful means of ejecting the payload from the 
Orbiter (even to  the extent of blasting through the Orbiter bay doors in the event that 
they could not be opened normally or rapidly). 
Design of the nuclear waste canister and the reentry protection system was 
dictated by safety requirements. Special payload packaging design requirements are as 
follows: 
(1) Design the cocoon so that the insulation and ablation material can be blown 
off in an emergency condition requiring immediate cooling. 
(2) Package the payload in the Orbiter such that it will withstand a low altitude 
Orbiter-to-land crash or an Orbiter-to-water crash. 
(3) Design the payload so that parachutes or aerodynamic braking will limit the 
water impact to  such a level that the nuclear waste package will remain intact. 
(4) Design the payload so that it will float in sea water. 
( 5 )  Provide search and recovery aids such as radio transponders, soiiar pingers, 
dye markers, etc., which will aid in rapid recovery of the payload. 
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(6) Design for adequate cooling of the radioactive waste during seek and 
recovery operations. 
(7) Incorporate a stabilization system in the payload package to prevent 
tumbling during LEO maneuvers. 
(8) Design the payload so that the O W  is attachable to  either the radioactive 
waste package or the entire payload. 
(9) Design the nuclear waste package so that an OTV can attach to  either end. 
(10) Design the shield/cocoon with sufficient strength to  contain the nuclear 
waste in the event of a Shuttle explosion at the launch pad. 
88 
VIII. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Space disposal of the nuclear waste will place added requirements on the planned 
STS. Additional safety requirements will have to be satisfied due to the hazardous nature 
of the payload. More launches will be required, thus additional launch facilities will be 
needed in the late 1990’s. Also, a high performance upper stage will be required to 
support the space disposal of nuclear waste. 
The transportation of nuclear waste into space involves two phases: (1) boost into 
a LEO and (2) transfer from LEO t o  the final destination. The Space Shuttle and the 
STS derived Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) were chosen for the boost phase of the 
mission. A high performance cryogenic propellant OTV was selected for waste 
transportation from LEO t o  the final destination. Boost vehicle and OTV characteristics 
are summarized in Tables 10 and 11. 
TABLE 10. BOOST VEHICLE CONCEPTS 
- 
Space Shuttle 
STS-Derived HLLV 
Class 1 ( 2  SRB) 
Class I1 (4 SRB) 
LOX-RPI Ballistic Booster 
LOX-RPI Winged Booster 
- 
Payload to LEO (160 n.mi.) - 29 483 kg 
Payload to  LEO (270 n.mi.) - 59 200 kg 
Payload t o  LEO (270 n.mi.) - 101 000 kg 
Payload t o  LEO (270 n.mi.) - 89 000 kg 
Payload to  LEO (270 n.mi.) - 99 000 kg 
TABLE 11.  UPPER STAGE CONCEPTS 
Standard OTV (ISP = 470 s) 
Main Propellant Weight = 25 242 kg 
Bumout Weight = 2890 kg 
Optimized OTV 
ISP = 470 s 
Main Propellant Weight = Variable 
Burnout Weight = Variable 
Optimized Kick Stage 
ISP = 300 s 
Mass Fraction = 0.9 
Main Propellant Weight = Variable 
Burnout Weight = Variable 
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A. Space Shuttle and Required Modifications 
The Space Shuttle is a new class of space vehicle in that it is reusable and can 
transport payloads to LEO and back. The reuseability of the Space Shuttle has lowered 
the cost of transporting payloads into space. Also, the Space Shuttle is a manned vehicle, 
and the airplane like Orbiter has intact abort capability, thus making it safer than 
previous launch vehicles. The Space Shuttle has a payload capability of 29 483 kg to 
LEO (296 km circular altitude) [ 181. The nuclear waste disposal program could use the 
basic Space Shuttle with a few minor modifications. Modifications that have been 
identified are as follows: 
(1) A heat exchanger system for dissipation of heat generated by the nuclear 
waste. This system would include coolant tanks, coolant, coolant lines, and a method of 
connecting to a portable cooling system on the ground. 
(2) A method for blowing the cargo bay doors off in case of a catastrophic 
Shuttle failure. 
(3) An improved stronger landing gear may be required to increase the safety 
margin on landing heavy payloads. 
(4) An improved Remote Manipulator System (RMS) may be required for 
handling the nuclear waste payload. The current requirements state that RMS can remove 
and replace a 29483 kg payload without releasing the payload. Once the payload is 
released, the requirement is that the RMS can retrieve and place in the cargo bay a 
payload of 14 5 15 kg. 
B. OTV Definition 
Vehicles potentially available for use in transferring nuclear waste from LEO to its 
final destination are (1) Interim Upper Stage (IUS), (2) storable liquid, (3) cryogenic, and 
(4) solar electric. The main emphasis of this study is on pure chemical systems; therefore, 
solar electric propulsion was not investigated. Figure 33 presents the results of a study to 
determine the effects of upper stage ISP on total program “cost” for the lunar surface 
mission. Assumptions for this study are: (1) all waste generated by the nuclear power 
industry between 1975 and 1995 will be reprocessed and transported beginning in 1985 
and ending in 2005, (2) two Shuttle launches per mission, and (3) cost assumptions as 
shown in Figure 33. As can be seen from the graph, a total program savings of 
approximately $3 X lo9 is realized if Mix 3 is transported via an OTV with ISP = 470 s 
versus an OTV with ISP=444 s. The cost of a single O W  tends to decrease with a 
decrease in engine ISP, but total program cost increases. This increase is due to Shuttle 
cost overshadowing OTV cost. In light of this information, a cryogenic OTV [ 191 with 
an ISP of 470 s was selected as the basic upper stage for the nuclear waste disposal 
program. 
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Figure 33. Total mission savings versus OTV ISP. 
Special OTV features which have been identified for the nuclear waste disposal 
mission are as follows: 
( I )  Design of the OTV docking mechanism so that it can release the payload by 
external command independent of the normal system. 
( 2 )  OTV should have fi completely redundant attitude propulsion system. 
(3) Either a shadow shield should be provided for the OTV avionics or radiatioii 
hardened avionics (or both) should be used. 
There is approximately 6 months between the first and second burns of the OTV 
for the solar orbit mission. This time lag between burns is extremely long for a cryogenic 
stage; therefore, only the first burn will be performed by the OTV. An “optimized” solid 
stage was assumed for the second burn. This stage has a mass fraction of 0.9 and an ISP 
of 300 s. 
Missions employing the HLLV for the boost phase of the mission require only 
one launch per mission. The waste package and the OTV are carried by the same HLLV. 
The OTV used on missions involving the HLLV is an optimized stage. It is based on 
Reference 19 and is sized to transfer to the final destination, in an expendable mode, the 
exact amount of waste placed in LEO. 
The OTV is conceived as a reusable vehicle but in some options it is to be used in 
an expendable mode. Significant reductions in weight and cost can be achieved by 
redesigning this stage as an expendable stage. The redesign work has not been attempted 
for this study. 
C. Reusable Versus Expendable OTV 
Current concepts of the high performance cryogenic OTV are designed for 
reusability; however, Shuttle launch cost is a significant part of this program’s cost, thus 
it may be more economical to  fly the OTV in an expendable mode. If the OTV is to be 
flown in reusable mode, the total program cost (OTV reusable) < total program cost 
(OTV expendable). 
Some insight to this question can be gained by the following mathematical 
exercise. 
Let 
CO = cost of Orbiter/flight 
CE = cost of OTV in expendable mode/OTV 
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CEOPS = cost of operations for expendable OTV 
CROPS = cost of operations for reusable O W  
CK 
PR 
PE 
wM 
TFR 
TFE 
TCR 
TCE 
= cost of a kick stage 
= payload on reusable mission 
= payload on expendable mission 
= total mass of waste for disposal 
= total number of missions (reusable OTV) 
= total number of missions (expendable OTV) 
= total program cost (reusable OTV) 
= total program cost (expendable OTV). 
If OTV reusability is to be economically feasible then 
TCR TCE . 
Note : 
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or 
Note: 
or 
This is an expression relating the ratio of the payloads to program cost. Making 
the following cost assumptions: 
C o  = $15 X lo6 
CE = $5.24 X lo6 
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then 
PR/PE = 0.87. 
This means that the reusable payload must be 87 percent of the expendable 
payload if reusability is to be economically feasible. For destinations covered in this 
study: 
Lunar Landing HE06 Solar Orbit6 Solar Escape 
P R ~ P E  0.80 1 1 0 
This model is a very simple one, and assumptions have been slanted to  make 
reusability look as good as possible. Reusability of the OTV will be assumed only for the 
HE0 mission and the solar orbit mission. 
D. Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Vehicles 
Most of the emphasis has been on the Space Shuttle as the launch vehicle. It will 
be available, it is reusable, it is man rated, and it has a unique abort capability which 
utilizes the glide capability of the Orbiter. However, any improvements in payload 
capability can be effectively utilized in the space disposal of nuclear waste. Several 
Shuttle-derived HLLV configurations have been investigated by NASA for use in other 
programs [20].  These launch vehicles have payload to  LEO capabilities ranging from 
68 000 to 120 000 kg. Since the HLLV’s have a payload to  LEO of more than twice the 
Shuttle, only one HLLV would be required per mission, i.e., both waste package and the 
OTV are carried on one vehicle. Thus, use of a HLLV would reduce the launch rate by a 
factor of 2 or more. 
An attractive mission scenario would be one that employs the Space Shuttle 
during the first few years of waste disposal when the required launch rate is low (< 26 
per year) and then phases to the HLLV, if it becomes available, later in the program. 
Launch rates for such a mission are discussed in the next section. 
6. OTV capability exceeds Shuttle capability 
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E. Traffic Analysis 
A large portion of the cost of disposal of nuclear waste in space is the cost of 
transportation into space. This section presents in tabular and graphical form the number 
of flights necessary to transport the waste created by the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry in 
the period 1975 to  1995. Assumptions for this study are as follows: 
(1) Amount of waste based on April 1977 ERDA estimates of U.S. nuclear 
power generating capacity [5]. Figure 1 shows the generating capacity, while Figure 2 
presents the amount of waste produced for the various mixes (see Section I1 for 
discussion of the mixes). 
(2) Waste will be reprocessed and will be available for space disposal 10 years 
after discharge from the reactor. This is an unrealistic assumption in some cases because 
there is currently no reprocessing in the U.S.; however, we are only determining the 
number of flights required, thus the year in which the program starts is not important. 
Some change in the number of flights will occur as the waste ages due to  lighter shielding 
requirements but this will be insignificant. 
(3) Vehicles used and destinations considered are discussed in Sections VI11 and 
111. 
Tables 12 through 16 present weight statements for the five launch vehicles. A 
weight statement is included for each destination in combination with Mixes 3, 5, and 5a. 
Two Shuttle launches are required for each disposal mission. One Shuttle transports waste 
only and the other transports an OTV and, if necessary, a solid stage. All of the HLLV’s 
transport the waste and the OTV on one flight. 
Cost of transporting waste into space is somewhat dependent on the total number 
of flights required. Total number of flights is dependent on type of launch vehicle, waste 
mix, and destination. This does not mean that the combination of destination, waste mix, 
and launch vehicle with the fewest number of flights will be the least expensive. There 
are other factors to  be considered, Le., cost of research and development of launch 
vehicles, cost of reprocessing, and most important the safety factor. Although the total 
number of launch vehicle flights is not the only factor to be considered when selecting a 
mission scenario, it is certainly an important factor, thus, total number of flights required 
for the various combinations of launch vehicle, destination, and waste mix is presented in 
Table 17. 
Yearly launch rates for various combinations of launch vehicle, waste mix, and 
destination are presented in Figures 34 through 37. Figure 34 presents graphically launch 
rates for the lunar surface mission, the three mixes, and a Shuttle launch vehicle or when 
Shuttle launch rates become high, a Class I1 winged booster HLLV. Two facts to be 
noted are: (1) more reprocessing - fewer flights and (2) if a HLLV is available 6 to 10 
years into the program launch rates remain reasonable low. Figure 35 depicts yearly 
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TABLE 12. SHUTTLE WEIGHT STATEMENT (kg) 
MIX 3 MIX 5 MIX 5A 
SOL SOL SOL SOL SOL SOL 
SHUTTIE LSL HE0 ESC ORB L S L  HE0 ESC ORB LSL HE0 ESC ORB 
TOTAL P L  29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 29483 
WASTE 4408 4408 687 4408 4510 4510 687 4510 4436 4436 687 4436 
SHIELD 8941 8941 2896 8941 9416 ~ 9416 3025 9416 8959 8959 2884 8959 
CLAD 331 331 92 331 336 336 92 33b 332 332 92 332 
F I N S  70 70  23 70  7 1  7 1  23 7 1  70  70  23 70 
AERO PROTECTION 9352 9352 3372 9352 9698 9698 3448 9698 9380 9380 3364 9380 
SYSTEM -- 
COOL SYS 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 
WATER 1392 1392 217 1392 380 380 58 380 1313 1313 203 1313 
E J E C T I O N  SYS 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 
PALLET 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
SHROUD 
OTV 
KICK STAGE 
CONTINGENCY 2102 2102 9135 2102 2185 2185 9043 2185 2106 2106 9203 2106 
TOTAL FLTS' 1078 1078 3634 1078 4 8 4  484 2375 484 696 696 3013 696 
ONE HALF OF FLIGHTS CARRY WASTE: EXCEPT SOLAR ESCAPE WHERE ONLY 1 / 3  CARRY WASTE. 
TABLE 13. CLASS I STS-DERIVED HLLV WEIGHT STATEMENT (kg) 
CLASS I S T S  - 
DERIVED HLLV L S L -  
TOTAL PL 68156 
- - WASTE 5136 
SHIELD 9993 
- C U D  372 
- F I N S  76 
AERO PROTECTION 10438 
- SYSTEM 
COOL SYS 542 
WATER 1622 
EJECTION SYS 1400 
PALIET 945 
SHROUD 6325 
OTV 28354 
KICK STAGE 
CONTINGENCY 2953 
TOTAL F L T S  462 
MIX 3 
s OL 
HE0 ESC .- 
68156 68156 
8000 1420- 
13723 4175 
528 148 
96 37 
14466 4610 
542 542 
2526 - 4 4 8  
1400 1400 
945 945 
4507 8864 
17859 43551 
3564 2016 
297 1648 
SOL 
-ORB 
68156 
6537 
449 
86 
12458 
542 
2064 
1400 
945 
- 11.900 
4610 
18833 
4681 
3.65 1 
363 
L S L  
68156 
5186 
10426 
77 
10728 
542 
437 
1400 
945 
6381 
-28630 
3030 
2 10 
374- 
MIX 5 
SOL 
HE0 ESC 
68156 68156 
8143 . 1 4 2 1  
14406 4342 
536- -148 
9 7 .  37 
14963 4710 
542 .:..S42 
686 120 
1400 1400 
4575 8870 
- 18174 43580 
3689 - 2041 
134 769 
- 
. .  945 945 
s OL 
ORB 
68156 
6626 
1245 1 
454 
87 
12843 
542 
558 
1400 
945 
4663 
19086 
4744 
3757 
164 . 
- __ 
MIX 5A 
SOL SOL 
LSf HE0 ESC ORB 
68156 68156 68156 68156 
5148 8031 1422 6558 
9986--13728 4162 11898 
3.72 530 148 450 
76 96 37 86 
10442 14488 4603 12471 
542 
1524 
1400 
945 
6340 
28425 
2956 
299 
542 542 542 
2377 421 1941 
1400 1400 1400 
945 945 945 
4522 8872 4622 
17928 43590 18892 
4696 
3569 2014 3655 
192 1086 235 
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TABLE 14. CLASS I1 STS-DERIVED HLLV WEIGHT STATEMENT (kg) 
MIX3 
C U S S  I1 STS- SOL SOL 
ORB 
120660 
_ _ ~-~ 
DERIVED HLLV LSL HE0 ESC 
TOTAL PL 120660 120660 120660- ~ 
WASTE 10000 16387 2718 12985 
SHIELD 15941 20875 6332 18653 
CZAD 635 964 231 790 
FINS 108 138 54 123 
AERO 
LSL 
120660 
10122 
16681 
- 641 
L O 8  
- 
MIX 5 
HE0 ESC 
120660 120660 
16778 2723 
22030 - 6574 
984 232 
140 54 
SOL s OL 
ORB 
120660 
13208 
19600 
802 
124 
LSL 
._120660 
10027 
15929 
636 
108 
MIX 5A 
SOL 
HE0 ESC 
120660 120660 
16462 272Q 
20856 631.7 
968 231 
139 54 
SOL 
ORB 
120660 
13030 
18641 
792 
123 
PROTECTION 17047 23995 6725 20537 17563 24928 6872 21240 17056 24032 6717 20558 
SYSTEM 
COOL SYS 542 542 542 542 - 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 
WATER 3158 5175 858- 4100 852 1413 230 1112 2968 4872 805 3857 
EJECTION SYS 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 
SHROUD 11564 8355 16200 8371 11693 8531 16231 8500 11591 8389 16213 8397 
OTV 54557 36220 81470 37011 55210 37075 816.32 37635 54695 36384 81534 37136 - 
KICK STAGE 9200 - 9355 9231 
CONTINGENCY 4763 5564 3i85 6003 4903 5894 3225 6197 4763 5671 3182. 6119 
P A L E T  945 945 945 945 945 945 945 . 945 945 945 945 945 
237 145 874 183 - 107 65 401 82 154 93 . 567 118. TOTAL FLTS 
TABLE 15. BALLISTIC HLLV WEIGHT STATEMENT (kg) 
MIX 3 
BALLISTIC SOL 
HLLV LSL HE0 ESC- 
TOTAL PL 102111 102111 102111 
WASTE 8243 13232 2257 
SHIELD 14011 18845 5581 
C U D  541 803 203 
FINS 98 124 ~ 48 
___ s OL 
ORB 
102111 
10619 
16562 
667 
111 
MIX 5 ~ 
LSL HE0 
102111 102111 
8338 13518 
14645 19853 
546 817 
. -  98 125 
~~ - 
s OL 
ESC 
2261 
5797 
203 
49 
io2111 
s OL 
ORB 
102111 
1.0789 
17376. 
. 676 
112 
MIX 5A 
LSL HE0 
102111 102111 
8264 13289. 
14001. 18841 
542 806 
98 125- 
SOL 
ESC 
102111 
2259. 
5567 
203 
48 
SOL 
ORB 
102111 
10654 
16555 
. 669 
111 
AERO 
PROTECTION 14791 20807 5984 17804 15228 21586 6115 18397 14799 20840 5977 17823 
SYSTEM 
COOL SYS 542 542 542 542 -542 542 542 542 542 542 542- 542 
WATER 2603 4179 713 3353 702 1138 190 909 2446 3933 668 3153 
EJECTION SYS 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 
9684 6924 13610 7005 9786 7055 13632 7104 9707 6950 13621 7025 SHROUD 
OTV 45105 29322 68051 30350 45616 29949 68164 30829 45218 29447 68105 30449 
KICK STAGE 7544 7663 7568 
CONTINGENCY 4148 4988 2777 5209 4265 5183 2813 5369 4149 4993 2776 5217 
PALET 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
186 116 683 144 TOTAL FLTS 288 179 1052 223 131 80 483 101 
-. 
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TABLE 16. CLASS I1 WINGED HLLV WEIGHT STATEMENT (kg) 
CLASS I1 
WINGED HLLV 
TOTAL PL 
WASTE 
SHIELD 
C W  
. FINS 
AERO 
PROTECTION 
SYSTEM 
COOL SYS 
WATER 
E J E C T I O N  SYS 
PALZET 
SHROUD 
OTV 
K I C K  STAGE 
CONTINGENCY 
TOTAL F L T S  
- 
M I X 3  
SOL 
E S C  LSL HE0 
114313 114313 
9394 15279 
15303 20253 
603 908 
104 134 
16285 22930 
542 542 
2967 4825 
1400 1400 
945 945 
10917 7854 
51297 33800 
4556 5443 
252 155 
1143 13 
2560 
6077 
222 
52 
6472 
542 
808 
1400 
945 
15313 
76874 
3048 
928 
SOL 
ORB 
114313 
12164 
17978 
748 
119 
19619 
542 
3841 
1400 
945 
8000 
34698 
8625 
5634 
195 
LSL 
114313 
9507 
16007 
608 
105 
16774 
542 
800 
1400 
945 
11037 
51900 
4688 
11% 
M I X  5 
HE0 
114313 
15632 
21361 
925 
135 
23811 
542 
1316 
1400 
945 
8014 
34570 
5662 
69 
s OL 
E SC 
114313 
2565 
6310 
222 
52 
6614 
542 
216 
1400 
945 
15342 
77018 
3087 
426 
SOL 
ORB 
114313 
12367 
18880 
758 
120 
20284 
542 
1041 
1400 
945 
8120 
35270 
8767 
5819 
88 
MIX 5A 
SOL SOL 
LSL HE0 ESC ORB 
114313 114313 114313 114313 
~~ 9418 15347 2562 12205 
15292 20240 6062 17968 
6 0 4  911 222 750 
104 134 52 119 
16294 22965 6465 19639 
542 542 542 542 
2788 ~ 4542 758 3612 
~ 
1400 1400 1400 1400 
945 945 945 945 
10942-  ~ 7885 15325 8050 
51426 33947 76934 34814 
8654 
4558 5455 3046 5615 
164 100 602 126 
- 
TABLE 17. TOTAL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS FOR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS 
M I X  3 
TOTAL NUMBER OF LAUNCH VEHICLE F L I G H T S  ~~ 
M I X  5 MIX 5A 
~ 
LAUNCH 
SOL SOL SOL SOL VEHICLE  SOL^  SOL^ 
LSL’ HEO’ ORB . ESC L S L  HE0 ORB ESC L S L  HE0 ORB ORB 
SHUTTLE 1078 1078 1078 3634 484 484 484 2375 696 696 696 3013 
C U S S  I S T S  - 462 297 363 1648 210 134 164 769 299 192 235 1086 
DERIVED HLLV ~ 
93 118 567 CLASS II STS - 237 145 i s 3  874 107 65 82 401 154 
DERIVED HLLV 
CLASS I1 
B A L L I S T I C  288 179 223 1052 131 80 101 483 186 116 144 683 
BOOSTER HLLV 
CLASS I1 
WINGED 252 155 195 928 114 69 88 426 164 100 126 602 
BOOSTER HLLV 
1 L S L  - LUNAR S W A C E  LANDING 
2 HE0 - HIGH EARTH ORBIT 
3 SOL ORB - SOLAR ORBIT 
4 SOL ESC - SOLAR SYSTEM ESCAPE 
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Figure 34. Launch rates for LSL mission. 
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Figure 35. Launch rates for the Class I STS-derived HLLV (Mix 3). 
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Figure 36. Launch rates for LSL mission (Mix 3). 
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Figure 37. Launch rates for Mix 3. 
c 
0 w 
launch rates for the Class I STSderived HLLV transporting Mix 3 to  the four 
destinations under consideration. The solar system escape mission has extremely high 
yearly launch rates; however, based on yearly launch rates the other destinations appear 
to  be viable candidates for final destination. To keep yearly launch rates reasonably low, 
a launch vehicle like an HLLV will be required for Mix 3. This is demonstrated for the 
lunar surface mission in Figure 36. Total number of missions required to  transport the 
waste Lunar Soft Landing (LSL), HEO, and solar orbit by the Shuttle/OTV combination 
are all the same in spite of the fact that total energy required is different for each. This 
is because the Shuttle can transport to LEO less waste than the OTV can transfer to  the 
final destination. If a reduction in some of the supporting systems could be achieved so 
that the Shuttle could transport to LEO as much waste as the OTV can transfer to  the 
final destination, a significant, although not spectacular, reduction in yearly launch 
results. This reduction is shown in Figure 37. 
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